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ABSTRACT 
Emotions influence our perception and decision making. It is of great importance to understand 
the neurophysiology behind these processes as they influence human core functions. Moreover, 
knowledge within this field is required in order to develop new medical therapies for 
pathological conditions that involve dysregulation of emotions. 
 
In this thesis the neural mechanisms of emotional regulation and decision making were 
investigated using different pharmacological manipulations and brain imaging. In Study I, we 
examined whether a CCKb-receptor and a mu-opioid receptor agonist could modulate emotional 
perception of visual stimuli in opposite directions. In Study II and III, we examined if 
amygdala, a subcortical structure involved in emotional coding, was involved in social 
punishment and neural processing of unfairness. The participants played an economic game that 
examined their proneness to hand out social punishment and their processing of unfairness. 
Prior to the game, participants had been treated with either an active drug (oxazepam or 
madopark) or placebo. With this intervention we could manipulate the participants‟ behavior 
and brain activity. Lastly, in Study IV we investigated neural mechanisms of hypothetical bias; 
that is, the difference between a real decision versus a hypothetical decision.  
 
In summary we found, in Study I, that the CCK-opioid system can modulate emotional visual 
perception in opposite directions. In Study II we demonstrate that amygdala is involved in 
social punishment and neural processing of unfairness. The degree to which participants gave 
out social punishment was suppressed with oxazepam without affecting the participants‟ 
perception of unfairness. In Study III we noted that madopark increased amygdala activity in 
response to unfairness without detectable changes in behavior. In Study IV, we showed that real 
decisions, in comparison to hypothetical decisions, involve amygdala processing and amygdala 
activity co-varies positively with the real cost for the participants.  
 
In conclusion, this thesis demonstrates that specific neuromodulatory systems participate in 
emotional regulation and decision making. Our findings also prompt an ethical discussion as we 
show that a commonly used drug influences core functions in the human brain that underlie 
individual autonomy and decision making. 
  
SAMMANFATTNING PÅ SVENSKA 
Känslor påverkar vår upplevelse av världen och vår förmåga att fatta beslut. Det är därför 
viktigt att förstå de underliggande hjärnprocesser för dessa fenomen eftersom de påverkar på 
grundläggande mänskliga beteenden. Kunskap inom området krävs för att kunna utveckla nya 
medicinska behandlingar för sjukdomstillstånd där bristande känslomässig reglering är ett 
problem.  
 
I denna avhandling utredde vi vilka delar av hjärnan som reglera våra känslor och 
beslutsfattning samt vilka ämnen i hjärnan som styr dessa processer. Vi studerade detta genom 
att påverka försöksdeltagarnas beteende med läkemedel samtidigt som vi undersökte deras 
hjärnaktivitet. I Studie I utredde vi huruvida två läkemedel (pentagastrin och remifentanil) 
kunde påverka upplevelsen av känslomässiga bilder i motsatta riktningar. I Studie II och III 
undersökte vi om amygdala, en “primitiv” hjärnstruktur som bearbetar känslor, var inblandad i 
social bestraffning och bearbetning av orättvisa. Deltagarna spelade ett ekonomiskt spel, som 
undersökte deras benägenhet att utdela social bestraffning och bearbetning av orättvisa, 
samtidigt som de mottagit antigen en aktiv läkemedelsbehandling oxazepam (lugnande 
läkemedel) eller madopark (stimulerande läkemedel), eller ett sockerpiller. Således, kunde vi 
påverka deras beteende och hjärnaktivitet. I Studie IV undersökte vi vilka delar av hjärnan som 
ligger bakom “hypotetisk påverkan”, det vill säga, skillnaden mellan att fatta ett riktigt beslut 
jämfört med att ta ett hypotetiskt beslut.  
 
I korthet rapporterar vi, i Studie I, att pentagastrin och remifentanil kan påverka känslomässiga 
synintryck i motsatta riktningar. I Studie II visar vi att amygdala deltar i social bestraffning och 
bearbetning av rättvisa. Graden av att utdela social bestraffning minskade med oxazepam utan 
att påverka deltagarnas upplevelse av orättvisa. I Studie III demonstrerar vi att madopark ökade 
amygdala aktivitet som svar på orättvisa utan att märkbart påverka beteende. I Studie IV visar 
vi att riktiga beslut i jämförelse med hypotetiska beslut involverar amygdala. 
 
Sammanfattningsvis, visar denna avhandling att specifika hjärnområden respektive vissa ämnen 
i hjärnan deltar i regleringen av känslor och beslutsfattning. Våra fynd uppmanar även till en 
etisk debatt då vi visat att vanligt förekommande läkemedel kan påverka beslutsfattning utan att 
påverka ens förnimmelse av situationen.  
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1 PROLOGUE 
 
The main theme for this thesis is Neuroeconomics, a multidisciplinary field that 
integrates methods from economics, psychology, and neuroscience to study human 
decision making (Clithero et al., 2008). By combining behavioral economic paradigms 
with mathematical models, pharmacological manipulations and neurophysiological 
methods, the field has been fruitful and gained new insights about choice behavior. 
This multidisciplinary approach has also yielded challenges in terms of validity of 
suggested theoretical models and interpretation of biological data. One important 
difference in traditions between economics and neuroscience (and a source of 
misinterpretation) is that the former does not necessarily need to fit theoretical models 
with behavioral data as long as the mathematical proofs are correct (Camerer, 2003). 
Thus, mathematical models that are anatomy free and presented without experimental 
anchoring (Rangel et al., 2008) easily create interdisciplinary conflicts when these 
models are used as the only approach. In contrast, neuroscientific and psychological 
models usually rest on behavioral observations of human behavior i.e. empirical data. 
 
In order to bridge these various differences, it is of importance that different views are 
merged. In the three latter studies, in this thesis, we try to apply an integrative approach 
aiming to make the economic, the mathematic and the neuroscientific sciences come 
closer together.  
 
 
Katarina A.M. Gospic 
Stockholm 2011-07-25 
  
 2 
2 INTRODUCTION 
 
2.1 EMOTIONS 
2.1.1 Definition and function 
An emotion is defined as a collection of responses that are triggered from the brain to 
the body and from parts of the brain to other parts of the brain (Damasio, 2001). These 
communications are of both neural and humoral nature and the result of this 
communication is an emotional state (Damasio, 2001). The main function with 
emotions is to adapt us to various situations. Therefore, emotions evaluate situations in 
terms of goals i.e. if we should approach or avoid the situation. They also prepare us to 
act, by giving priority to specific actions that are urgent (Adolphs, 2010). 
 
An important distinction to make is the one between emotion and feeling; an emotion is 
the physiological response associated to an emotional event. For example, when we 
encounter a snake during a forest hike we will react with increased heart rate and 
sweating before becoming aware of the snake (Gazzaniga et al., 2002; LeDoux, 1999). 
These physiological adjustments are our emotional response to the snake and are 
triggered foremost by the subcortical structure amygdala (Davis, 1997).  
 
A feeling is defined as a complex mental state resulting from an emotional state and 
involves bodily and cognitive changes (Damasio, 2001). Another term for feeling is 
feeling state (Craig, 2009). The concept of feeling states is based on the notion that a 
cortical structure called insula provides a neural correlate for all subjective feelings 
from the body. Interestingly, it seems that our experience of an emotion is our 
perception of the bodily state that is associated with the physiological changes induced 
by the emotional response (Craig, 2009).  
 
2.1.2 Classification of emotions 
There are various systems and scales to classify emotions. The most known and used 
ones are: the Ekman classification and the Lang arousal/valance classification. In the 
early 70‟s Paul Ekman conducted facial expression studies all over the world. The 
discovery from his journeys was that some facial expressions could be observed across 
the globe, independently of culture and geographical location. Based on observed facial 
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expressions Ekman suggested that there are six basic emotions i.e. anger, fear, 
happiness, sadness, disgust and surprise (Gazzaniga et al., 2002).  
 
Peter Lang proposed another type of emotional categorization based on the level of 
arousal and valance (Bradley and Lang, 1994; Lang et al., 2001). Arousal reflects our 
level of excitement in relation to the stimulus whereas valance is linked to whether we 
consider a stimulus to be good or bad. Lang‟s model quantifies emotional intensity with 
the help of a 2-dimensional coordinate system where valance is measured on the x-axis, 
arousal is measured on the y-axis and origo corresponds to a neutral stimulus. The more 
positive a stimulus is, the higher the value on the x-axis; the more exciting a stimulus 
is, the higher the value on the y-axis. 
 
2.1.3 Emotional regulation  
Emotional regulation refers to the heterogeneous set of processes by which the brain 
influences which emotions we have, when we have them, and how we experience and 
express these emotions (Gross, 2002). The ability to regulate emotions is important for 
adaption and helps us to act functionally. Thanks to the evolved human frontal lobes, 
our ability to regulate emotions is superior to other animals.  
 
Emotional regulation can be divided into attentional control and cognitive control 
(Ochsner and Gross, 2005). Both these aspects of emotional regulation involve cortical 
control which may also be referred to as top-down control (see also section 2.1.4). 
Different types of emotional regulation engage different neural networks. Attentional 
control can be divided in to selective attention and attentional distraction. In selective 
attention, imaging studies have demonstrated that lateral prefrontal cortex is involved in 
evaluating whether stimuli are good or bad whereas prefrontal cortex (PFC) and 
parietal cortex participate in attentional distraction (McRae et al., 2010; Ochsner and 
Gross, 2005). Cognitive change has many facets and can be divided into: anticipation, 
extinction, placebo, and reappraisal (Ochsner and Gross, 2005). In addition, meditation 
could be seen as a particular form of emotional regulation. Different kinds of networks 
are involved depending on the meditation technique. A concise presentation about 
different strategies for emotional regulation will be presented below.  
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2.1.4 Top-down control 
Top-down control reflects cortical regulation and is the highest level of control that the 
brain can exert of any physiological process (Roepstorff and Frith, 2004). As a result, 
top-down control is an important part of the emotional regulation system (Mobbs et al., 
2006; Petrovic et al., 2005). All types of top-down control do not solely involve 
emotional regulation but also other regulatory processes e.g. pain regulation (Colloca 
and Benedetti, 2005; Petrovic, 2002). 
 
The neural mechanisms involved in top-down control can be context dependent and 
hence vary with the specific situation. Extinction, placebo, and reappraisal are all 
examples of top-down control and may be present in either an emotional or pain 
context or a combination of both. The following sections will briefly present the neural 
mechanisms of different contexts where top-down control is present.  
 
2.1.4.1 Extinction  
Emotional regulation has been widely studied in the context of fear and extinction. Fear 
extinction is the process where a conditioned fear stimulus is relearned and stripped of 
its emotional content so it will not be fearful anymore. Importantly, old fear memories 
are not removed by extinction (Myers and Davis, 2006) instead, a new memory is 
created in which the amygdala output is inhibited. There is solid evidence that 
amygdala is involved in fear expression (Davis, 1997) and ventromedial PFC (vmPFC) 
is important for the fear extinction process (Bishop, 2007). vmPFC participates in 
extinction by stimulating GABAergic neurons in amygdala which in turn inhibits 
amygdala output (fear expression) via GABAergic neurons (Bishop, 2007).  
 
2.1.4.2 Placebo, expectation and anticipation 
The placebo effect is a psychobiological phenomenon that leads to a clinical 
improvement (Colloca and Benedetti, 2005). The effect is not due to one single 
mechanism, but many. For example, positive expectation of improvement and 
Pavlovian conditioning are important components. Interestingly, it has been shown that 
administration of an exogenous opioid (remifentanil) and placebo induced expectation 
of pain relief, activates the same brain regions i.e., rostral anterior cingulate cortex 
(rACC), orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and anterior insula (AI) (Petrovic, 2002). In the 
same study, it was also demonstrated that there was a co-variation between rACC, 
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pons, medulla and periacqueductal grey (PAG) (Petrovic, 2002). These results suggest 
that the opioid system is part of a descending modulating circuit that regulates placebo 
analgesia (Colloca and Benedetti, 2005; Hoffman et al., 2005; Levine et al., 1978). In 
contrast to the opioid system, the cholecystokinin (CCK) system participates in nocebo. 
Benedetti et al. demonstrated that the CCK antagonist proglumide could enhance pain 
relief if a placebo response was induced i.e. expectation of pain relief. When 
proglumide was given as a hidden injection it did not induce any pain reduction. This 
indicates that the CCK system can modulate expectation pathways in an opposite 
direction, compared to opioids (Colloca and Benedetti, 2005).    
 
Anticipation is closely related to expectation and placebo and cannot be clearly 
segregated from them. Anticipation involves the act of predicting and its function is to 
make accurate predictions of events that lead to improved time and accuracy of 
behavioral responses (Posner and Petersen, 1990). Brain areas (i.e. dorsolateral PFC 
(dlPFC), medial PFC (mPFC) and OFC) that participates in anticipation of pain relief 
are closely related to areas involved in placebo (Carlsson et al., 2000; Colloca and 
Benedetti, 2005). 
 
Importantly, placebo responses can be induced for other modalities than just pain relief. 
For example, expectation of immune-suppression leads to decreased levels of cytokines 
(Colloca and Benedetti, 2005). In a similar manner, Parkinson patients can induce 
expectation effects for motor improvement when given placebo treatment; this 
expectation leads to dopamine release in striatum (Colloca and Benedetti, 2005). In 
conclusion, the above studies show that the brain uses specific networks and 
neuromodulatory systems to regulate placebo responses.  
 
2.1.4.3 Reappraisal 
Reappraisal is a voluntary and cognitive process in which we can change the way an 
emotion is interpreted (Kalisch, 2009; Lazarus, 1991). This process can both up- and 
down-regulate an emotional response. For example, if a subject views an unpleasant 
picture of a person dying, the subject can up-regulate this emotion by thinking that the 
person in the picture is suffering or down-regulate the emotion by thinking that the 
scene is taken from a movie and is therefore not real. Reappraisal that reduces negative 
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emotions activate frontal regions like dlPFC, mPFC and dorsal ACC (dACC) while 
reducing activity in amygdala (Phillips et al., 2008).  
 
2.1.4.4 Meditation 
Meditation is a family of mental training practice which evokes a physiological state 
that induces physical and mental relaxation (Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007; Rubia, 
2009).  Meditation has been shown to have a positive effect on depression and anxiety 
related symptoms (Rubia, 2009). Experienced meditators react less to stressful stimuli 
in terms of reduced psychological and physiological reactivity to emotional stimuli 
(Rubia, 2009). In clinical practice, meditation based methods, like acceptance 
commitment therapy, have become a target of interest to treat emotional disorders as it 
seems to regulate emotional processing (Pull, 2009).  
 
In general, different meditation strategies give rise to a variety of neural responses 
(Rubia, 2009). Meditation techniques using concentration on an object elicit neural 
activation in the fronto-parietal network (Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007) whereas 
techniques that focus on mindful breathing activate insula, mPFC and ACC (Farb et al., 
2007; Hölzel et al., 2007). Hence, it seems that meditation can engage neural networks 
involved in attentional and emotional processing.  
 
2.1.5 The anatomy of the emotional brain 
Specific anatomical regions in the brain work partly alone and in networks to mediate 
emotional responses, feeling states, and emotional regulation (Craig, 2009; Davis, 
1997; Mesulam, 1998; Ochsner and Gross, 2005). A particular region may be very 
important for a specific state, but not always necessary; this implies that brain regions 
are dependent on each other. Brain imaging techniques, psychophysiological methods 
and lesion studies have taught us which brain regions are specifically important for 
emotions. The following sections will briefly go through the brain structures involved 
in emotional processes.  
 
2.1.5.1 Periaqueductal grey  
PAG is a columnar organized region localized in the midbrain surrounding the 
aqueduct. PAG can be divided into three main sections, the ventrolateral, the lateral and 
the dorsolateral part. Quite simply, the ventrolateral PAG is involved in passive 
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responses whereas the lateral/dorsolateral parts are involved in active responses. More 
specifically, the ventrolateral PAG is involved in freezing responses whereas the rostral 
part of both the lateral PAG and the dorsolateral PAG mediate fight behavior, in 
contrast to the caudal part of both lateral PAG and the dorsolateral PAG that mediate 
flight behavior (Bandler et al., 2000; Bandler and Shipley, 1994).  
 
2.1.5.2 Amygdala 
Amygdala is an evolutionary ancient subcortical structure whose role has been 
emphasized within emotional research. Anatomically, amygdala can be divided into a 
number of regions; the basolateral nucleus, the central nucleus and the bed nucleus of 
the stria terminalis (BNST) have been of particular interest to emotional research 
(LeDoux, 1999). The first two structures are part of amygdala and entail amygdala‟s 
input level respectively output level. In contrast, the BNST is not actually amygdala, 
but part of the “extended amygdala” (Walker et al., 2003).  
 
Amygdala function has been related to fear processing while BNST has been shown to 
be more related to anxiety processing (Walker et al., 2003). More specifically,  the 
amygdala is involved in an extensive amount of emotional processes e.g. fear 
recognition, fear learning, fear processing, aggression, and trustworthiness (Ferris et al., 
2008; Phelps and LeDoux, 2005). Lesions in amygdala lead to impaired fear 
recognition, fear conditioning and social judgment (Adolphs et al., 2005; Adolphs et 
al., 1998; Bechara et al., 1995).   
 
The amygdala plays various but important roles in decision making, but the causality of 
amygdala involvement in these processes has not been shown. Previous imaging 
studies have found that amygdala responds to: value encoding at the time of the 
decision, self-blamed regret, breaking a promise, ambiguity, and the framing effect 
(Baumgartner et al., 2009; Brand et al., 2007; De Martino et al., 2006; Hsu et al., 2005; 
Jenison et al., 2011; Nicollea et al., 2011). Although these various functions have been 
suggested for amygdala, the common denominator for all these functions is value 
coding; that is, are incoming stimuli worth paying attention to and remembering?  
 
An important aspect to add is whether amygdala codes for valance or arousal. Some 
studies controlling for arousal suggest that amygdala is more involved in arousal 
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processing than value per se (Haber and Knutson, 2009). This interpretation is in line 
with studies that show rapid amygdala habituation to emotional stimuli (Haber and 
Knutson, 2009). The observation that amygdala activity in response to reward stimuli 
decreases with time while striatal activity (nucleus accumbens) increases over time 
(Gottfried et al., 2003) has generated the hypothesis that the striatum is more directly 
involved in reward processing than amygdala. However, it has been shown that 
amygdala activity is reduced with devaluation (Gottfried et al., 2003) and there is an 
extensive literature on amygdala‟s importance in recognizing emotions (Adolphs, 2002; 
O'Doherty, 2004). Thus, it may be more plausible that value is an interaction between 
intensity (arousal) and valance rather than valance alone (O'Doherty, 2004).  
 
2.1.5.3 Orbitofrontal cortex 
OFC is a cortical region located in the frontal lobes that is important for reward 
processing. In particular, OFC provides a representation of each specific reward or 
affective value in a common currency and is very plastic to changes as it updates 
reward values continuously (Rolls and Grabenhorst, 2008). For example, OFC 
represents the affective value of food only when it is rewarding. In real life, this 
phenomenon can be represented by people craving dessert even though they are no 
longer hungry. The neural mechanism behind this fact is that the main course is no 
longer rewarding as we are fed to satiety with it. Yet introduction of a dessert would be 
coded as rewarding as it represents something affectively valuable and novel.  
 
Importantly, OFC only signals reward value and not intensity or identity, it is also 
central for representing motivational value for primary and secondary reinforces as well 
as reward expectation of pain relief in placebo (Petrovic et al., 2010).  
 
In decision making paradigms OFC signals expected value (see section 2.2.3) and 
reward on a continuous scale (Rolls and Grabenhorst, 2008). OFC has also been shown 
to be involved in regret as it codes for the outcome of the non-chosen alternative where 
a greater reward could have been obtained compared to the chosen alternative (Coricelli 
et al., 2007).  
 
It has been suggested that OFC may be functionally divided into a medial part and a 
lateral part, respectively, an anterior-posterior dimension (Kringelbach, 2005). The 
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medial part has been paired with monitoring learning and memory of reward value 
while the lateral part has been linked to evaluation of punishment that can change 
behavior. The anterior-posterior feature to this division entails that more abstract 
representations are made more anteriorly (e.g. monetary gain and loss) whereas more 
simple representations are made more posteriorly (e.g. taste). 
 
2.1.5.4 Insula 
Insula is a limbic structure that is involved in interoceptive representation (Craig, 
2009). Previous brain imaging studies have shown that insula participates in pain 
perception, heartbeat awareness, neural processing of unfairness, self-recognition, time 
perception and empathy (Craig, 2003; Craig, 2009; Sanfey  et al., 2003; Singer et al., 
2006). The common nominator for these different functions is that insula processes 
interoception i.e. provides a representation of the current homeostasis of the body.  
 
From a functional anatomical view, insula can be divided into a posterior part and an 
anterior part. Interestingly, it seems that the posterior part represents the “true” sensory 
state (interoception) of the body‟s homeostasis whereas the anterior part maps “as if 
body loops” (Bechara and Damasio, 2005); that is, it simulates how we would feel if 
we were to be happy, sad, or in pain. Accordingly, the more abstract representation of a 
(feeling) state the more anterior parts of the insula participate in the neural processing 
of that stimulus (Craig, 2009). As a result of insula‟s role in representing the body‟s 
homeostasis these functions are also important for the representation of feeling states 
(Craig, 2003; Craig, 2009).  
 
Anterior insula (AI) is important for decision making; in a very influential study on the 
Ultimatum Game (UG) (see section 2.4.3.2), Sanfey et al. found that insula was 
involved in neural processing of unfairness and correlated with rejection rate of unfair 
monetary proposals (Sanfey et al., 2003). Insula is part of the empathy network and is 
sensitive to social interactions (Singer et al., 2004; Singer et al., 2006). In an imaging 
study, Singer et al. showed that empathy for pain (i.e. watching someone else suffer 
from pain) activated affective parts of the pain matrix (including AI) but not sensory 
components of the pain matrix (Ingvar, 1999; Singer et al., 2004). It has been suggested 
that when we watch someone else suffer from a pain stimulus, AI maps how we would 
feel if that particular event would have happened to ourselves. As a result, our ability to 
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relate to someone else‟s suffering seems to be an important component in neural 
processing of empathy.   
 
In a follow up study, Singer et al. examined how interactions in the UG modulated 
participants‟ emphatic responses when they watched proposers receiving pain stimuli 
(Singer et al., 2006). Interestingly, it was showed that AI activity went down in male 
participants when they watched other participants (proposers), who had previously 
treated them unfairly, receiving pain stimuli. In contrast, insula activity increased when 
they watched fellow participants (proposers), who had previously treated them fairly, 
receiving pain stimuli (Singer et al., 2006). These results suggest that insula is sensitive 
to social interactions in choice situations and participates in empathic processes.  
 
2.1.5.5 Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) is a cortical area important for working memory, 
upholding rules, cognitive control, and emotional regulation (Fuster, 1999; Levy and 
Goldman-Rakic, 2000; Miller and Cohen, 2001; Ochsner and Gross, 2005). Notably, 
the last statement concerning emotional regulation might not be true as recent studies 
have shown that when controlling for emotional bias, dlPFC is still active (Golkar et 
al.). This suggests that the actual role for dlPFC is to uphold rules and information.  
 
Experimental conditions that activate dlPFC are those where participants are asked to 
hold a task in memory over delay, follow instructions, and maintain and manipulate 
information (Baker et al., 1996; Barch et al., 1997). MacDonald et al. showed that 
dlPFC was specifically involved during task preparation which implies that dlPFC is 
involved in control implementation by representing and actively maintaining the 
attentional demands of the task (MacDonald et al., 2000).  
 
In decision making, dlPFC has been suggested to override selfish impulses (Knoch et 
al., 2006) and uphold goal values (Camus et al., 2009). Disruption of dlPFC activity has 
shown to increase selfish behavior (Knoch et al., 2006) and decrease values ascribed to 
a choice (Camus et al., 2009). These studies on decision making imply that dlPFC is 
involved in inhibition and value computation at the time of the choice.  
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2.1.5.6 Anterior cingulate cortex 
ACC is a cortical structure located in the frontal lobe. ACC is involved in conflict 
monitoring and conflict resolution. Depending on which kind of conflict the participant 
is faced with (i.e. cognitive or affective) different regions of the ACC will be involved 
in the conflict monitoring and resolution.  
 
The Color Stroop task is the classical test to detect conflict in the dACC (Bush et al., 
2000). In the Color Stroop task, participants are asked to name the color in which a 
word is written. The word can either be congruent or incongruent with the color. For 
example, a congruent task with low conflict would be the word RED as the word fits 
with the color. An incongruent task with high conflict would be GREEN where the 
word green is incongruent with the color blue. Comparing incongruent tasks to 
congruent tasks yields activation in dACC. This suggests that dACC is involved in 
neural processing of cognitive conflicts. 
 
Variations of the Stroop task have been used to investigate emotional conflict and 
conflict resolution. In the “Emotional Word Counting Stroop” participants are asked to 
state the number of times by which non-emotional or emotional words (e.g. “lamp” or 
“murderer”) appears on a screen (Bush et al., 2000). In comparison to non-emotional 
words the emotional word counting task activates rostral ACC (rACC). Other versions 
of emotional Stroop tasks have shown similar results (Etkin et al., 2006). Interestingly, 
Etkin et al. demonstrated that a congruent task followed by a second incongruent task 
increased the participants‟ performance on the second task in terms of reaction time and 
correct answer. This improvement followed the rACC activity; accordingly, it has been 
suggested that rACC also resolves emotional conflicts in addition to monitoring them 
(Etkin et al., 2006). These results support the suggestion that the rACC does indeed 
participate in top-down regulation of emotions. 
 
2.1.6 The neural network constituting the emotional brain 
As presented above, there are a number of brain structures that are important in 
emotional processing and regulation. Individual regions are important per se but it is 
their role in the emotional neural networks that makes up the whole. The brain works in 
reciprocal communicating networks to handle information processing (Mesulam, 1998) 
and the following section is a brief summary of how different emotional structures are 
connected to each other.  
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PAG receives input from various regions e.g. the spinal cord, the central nucleus of 
amygdala, nucleus tractus solitarius, PFC, insula, and ACC (Bandler and Shipley, 
1994). PAG outputs brain stem and spinal cord which enables PAG to modulate 
autonomic responses and pain processing (Bandler and Shipley, 1994).  
 
Amygdala can be viewed as the node in emotional processing as it has extensive 
mutual connections to structures like striatum, OFC, insula, and ACC. Amygdala 
evaluates reward value of a stimulus at an early stage (Baxter and Murray, 2002; 
O'Doherty, 2004) and the connection between amygdala and OFC is important for 
valuation of a stimulus. In addition, the amygdala input to OFC contributes to reward 
value representation in OFC (Schoenbaum et al., 2003). Amygdala and OFC are also 
connected to striatum, a nucleus that is also important for reward processing. In 
concert, these three structures are coding for predicted future reward (O'Doherty, 2004). 
This representation of predicted future reward is implicated in guiding action selection 
(O'Doherty, 2004).  
 
The amygdala does not only signal reward, it can also signal aversion. For example, 
exposure to an unpleasant odorant increases both activity in amygdala and OFC 
whereas less aversive odorants decrease amygdala processing alone, without affecting 
OFC activity (Zald and Pardo, 1997). Amygdala activity has also been observed in 
other aversive contexts e.g. monetary loss aversion and uncertainty (De Martino et al., 
2010; Hsu et al., 2005; Tom et al., 2007). 
 
Amygdala also outputs to brain nuclei like PAG, nucleus paraventricularis, nucleus 
basalis, and the lateral hypothalamus. Together, these structures give rise to 
physiological responses that characterize emotional expressions and feeling states 
(Figure 1). For example, in the case of fear, we get increased heart rate and sweating as 
well as elevated concentrations of stress hormones. All these bodily changes contribute 
to a feeling state of fear.   
 
OFC is a node for multisensory integration and receives input from all modalities. OFC 
is connected to other structures important for emotional processing i.e. amygdala, 
striatum, insula, ACC, and mPFC (Rolls and Grabenhorst, 2008). As mentioned earlier 
OFC is important for evaluating and learning whether a stimulus is of value or not.  
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Figure 1. From stimulus to behavior. Amygdala holds a key position in mediating emotional behavior. 
There is a “low road” via sensory thalamus directly to amygdala which enables fast emotional responses 
whereas the “high road” via cortical structures constitutes a slower affective neural processing. Amygdala 
communicates with different nuclei to mediate emotional behavior and physiological changes associated 
to the specific emotional state. The figure is based on information found in texts by Davis, Le Doux and 
Pessoa (Davis, 1997; LeDoux, 1999; Pessoa, 2011). 
 
Lesions in OFC lead to inappropriate responses, e.g. responding to a non-rewarding 
stimulus (Rolls and Grabenhorst, 2008).  
 
Insula is closely connected bi-directionally to amygdala, OFC, nucleus accumbens, 
ACC, dlPFC, and prefrontal areas. Thus, insula, a structure that is mainly involved in 
interoceptive representation, receives and conveys input to limbic structures that are 
especially important for reward value assessment (Singer et al., 2009). The insula and 
ACC connection seem to be of particular importance in emotional regulation. It has 
been suggested that these areas act as limbic sensory and limbic motor cortices 
respectively, constituting the feeling and the motivation that comprise an emotion 
(Craig, 2009). Additionally, signals from insula and ventral striatum represent 
important input to the mPFC when calculating costs versus gains (Haber and Knutson, 
2009).  
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dlPFC receives input from sensory cortices and has extensive output connections with 
the motor system e.g. pre-motor areas, rostral cingulate cortex, superior colliculus, 
cerebellum, and the basal ganglia (Miller and Cohen, 2001). It is believed that dlPFC 
can exert control (inhibition) over behavior through these structures.  dlPFC also have 
mutual connections with vmPFC (Miller and Cohen, 2001); consequently, information 
from wide-ranging brain systems can be integrated on a fairly local circuitry in the 
PFC. 
 
ACC is closely connected to amygdala (Etkin et al., 2011; Walton et al., 2007) and 
receives emotional information from this structure. ACC is important for regulating 
amygdala input (Bishop, 2007; Etkin et al., 2006) and the importance of ACC 
regulation of amygdala input is reflected in patients who suffer from anxiety disorders. 
These patients usually have a hyperactive amygdala function (Stein et al., 2007) and a 
deficit in cortical regulation (of amygdala) which results in anxiety associated 
symptoms (Bishop, 2007; Etkin and Wager, 2007).  
 
2.1.7 From stimulus to behavior  
There are two major paths by which emotional information can reach the brain. The 
first and most direct one is the “low road” which goes via thalamus to the amygdala and 
then results in a behavioral response (LeDoux, 1999; Öhman, 2005) (Figure 1). The 
second path, the “high road,” goes first via cortex before it reaches the amygdala and 
thereafter gives rise to a behavioral response (Gazzaniga et al., 2002; LeDoux, 1999) 
(Figure 1). In the mirror of the Cannon-Bard versus James Lang theories, it seems that 
the above processes run in parallel and we experience feeling states (Craig, 2009) both 
as a consequence of bodily reactions (James Lang) and vice versa i.e. the experience of 
a feeling state can also alter bodily processes (Cannon-Bard) (Gazzaniga et al., 2002). 
This means that some processes are automatized; a classical example is the one where a 
hiker discovers a snake in the forest. Before he knows it his heart is pounding and his 
blood pressure has increased (Gazzaniga et al., 2002). By using the low road we are 
able to adjust rapidly to situations that are crucial. If these processes were to take longer 
i.e. if we were to use cognitive computational skills instead, the snake would already 
have attacked. Hence, rapid automatic responses have evolved as they promote 
survival.  
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2.1.8 Emotional perception 
Perception includes the physiological systems that are active in interpreting sensory 
stimuli. As we have different modalities of sensory stimuli, both separate and 
overlapping systems are involved in the neural process of perception (Gazzaniga et al., 
2002). Emotional perception can also vary in modality, for example, a picture of a 
loved one is a visual emotional stimulus while a punch in the face is an emotional 
sensory stimulus. Common for the different modalities is that they have primary 
cortices (e.g. primary visual cortex and primary sensory cortex) in which the signal is 
interpreted and conveyed to more multi-sensory areas (e.g. OFC) in order to create a 
more complex and complete experience (Rolls, 2004). These multi-sensory areas are in 
turn connected to other structures involved in emotional processing (e.g. amygdala and 
insula) (Rolls, 2004).  
 
2.1.9 Evolutionary perspective 
Evolution has helped organisms to evolve and adapt in the most efficient way (Hau and 
Wikelsk, 2001). Emotions and human facial expressions represent biologically 
developed adaptations (Öhman, 2009). Fear, for example, is a signal reflecting potential 
threat and risk of being harmed. As a result, emotions help us value and remember 
things that are considered to be important and we remember emotional events better 
than neutral ones as they carry salient information (Gospic et al., 2008).  
 
With evolution, some neural processes have become automatic in order to save 
computational power and to be able to execute actions as rapidly as possible when 
needed. For example, it is very convenient to have jumped over a snake before even 
noticing it on a more conscious level (Gazzaniga et al., 2002). These automatic instant 
processes are located in the most evolutionary old parts of the neural system like the 
spinal cord, brain stem and the amygdala (Jarvis et al., 2005; Kolb and Whishaw, 2003; 
LeDoux, 1999).  
 
With time, the human brain has evolved cortical structures that are able to compute 
future representations as well as upholding concepts of strategical thinking and 
planning (Fuster, 2008). These structures are mainly located in the frontal part of the 
brain and the more anterior/lateral the part is, the more evolutionary young it is 
(LeDoux, 1999). Even though humans carry a heritage of neural wiring similar to 
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reptiles, we have evolved complex cortical structures that enable us to inhibit and 
regulate these “primitive” impulses in order to quickly adjust to new environments.  
 
2.1.10 Pharmacological manipulation of feeling states and perception 
From clinical practice we have learned that it is possible to manipulate feeling states 
and perception. For example, anxiolytic drugs can reduce anxiety in patients suffering 
from anxiety disorders (Basile et al., 2004). Some drugs may induce unwanted changes 
of feeling states e.g. pentagastrin (cholecystokinin (CCK)) can induce panic attacks 
(Bradwejn, 1992) while L-DOPA (precursor to dopamine) can increase aggressiveness 
and impulsiveness (Cools and Robbins, 2004; Nelson and Trainor, 2007). Conventional 
pain-killers like anti-inflammatory substances can decrease pain perception by reducing 
noxious input to the brain (Rang et al., 2003) while opioids can modulate perception by 
changing both the noxious input to the brain and the perception of how a painful 
stimulus is experienced (Fields, 1999; Vogt, 1993).  
 
In conclusion, these findings show that both feeling states and perception can be 
pharmacologically manipulated. The following sections describe the effects of the four 
drugs, used in this thesis, on behaviors related to emotional perception and decision 
making.  
 
2.1.10.1 Cholecystokinin 
CCK is an excitatory, gut-brain peptide that acts on g-protein coupled CCK receptors. 
CCK acts on CCKa and CCKb receptors. Both receptor types are found in the gut and 
the brain, but the CCKa receptor is the predominant receptor in the gut while the CCKb 
receptor is the predominant receptor in the brain. The expression of the CCKb receptor 
is particularly high in the amygdala, hippocampus, and PFC (Radu, 2005).  
 
Peripherally, CCK induces the release of bile and in the brain CCK participates in the 
regulation of satiety, pain, and anxiety (Radu, 2005). The functions of the CCK system 
have been mostly studied in pain. For example, animal studies have demonstrated that 
CCK concentration increases in ACC after axotomy (model for phantom pain) which 
has been suggested to contribute to the subjective experience of pain (Gustafsson et al., 
2000). In humans, the CCK system has been shown to be involved in nocebo and it acts 
in an opposite direction, compared to the opioid system (Colloca and Benedetti, 2005). 
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CCK can also, in higher doses, induce anxiety as well as panic attacks (Bradwejn, 
1992; deMontigny, 1989), and on a functional anatomical level, these states seems to 
co-vary with amygdala and insula activity (Eser et al., 2009; Javanmard et al., 1999). 
Together, these findings make the CCK system an interesting target for studying 
emotion related processes. In Study I (Gospic et al., 2008), we investigated if the CCK 
system may modulate emotional perception in a similar way as it modulates pain.  
 
2.1.10.2 Opioids 
The opioid system is commonly known to induce pain relief and induce pleasantness 
(Berridge, 2003; Fields, 1999; Koob et al., 1989). Opioids may target one or many of 
the different kinds of opioid receptors and each of the receptor types has endogenous 
peptides that target them specifically. For example, beta-endorphin targets the mu-
receptor, enkephaline targets the delta, and the mu-receptor and dynorphine targets the 
kappa-receptor. Opioid receptors are found both peripherally and centrally. In the brain, 
high opioid receptor concentrations are found in amygdala, insula, and ACC (Vogt, 
1993; Zubieta and Koeppe, 2001).  
 
Previous studies on pain have shown that the opioid system participates in the placebo 
response (Colloca and Benedetti, 2005; Levine et al., 1978). For example, Petrovic et 
al. demonstrated that similar brain regions (including ACC) are activated when an 
external opioid is administered and when a placebo response is induced. In Study I, we 
investigated if the opioid system could modulate emotional perception in a similar 
manner as it regulates pain.  
 
2.1.10.3 Benzodiazepines 
Benzodiazepines are pharmacological substances that target neural inhibitory GABA 
receptors. GABA receptors are abundant in the amygdala (Braestrup et al., 1977) and 
benzodiazepines can potentiate GABA activity (Rang et al., 2003), reduce behavioral 
signs of aggression (Nelson and Trainor, 2007), and decrease amygdala activity in 
emotional tasks (Arce et al., 2006; Paulus et al., 2005). Clinically, benzodiazepines are 
used to reduce anxiety (Basile et al., 2004).  
 
Studies on decision making and the GABA system have shown that alcohol (GABA 
receptor stimulator) and diazepam increase risk taking behavior (Deakin et al., 2004; 
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Lane et al., 2004). In Study II, we investigated the behavioral and neural effects of the 
benzodiazepine oxazepam on decision making in the UG.  
 
2.1.10.4 Dopamine 
In the brain, dopamine producing neurons are found in the substansia nigra (SN) and 
ventral tegmental area (VTA) (Vallone et al., 2000). SN and VTA project, via the 
nigrostriatal pathway, the mesolimbic pathway, and the mesocortical pathway to 
striatum, amygdala, insula, and ACC. These regions have a high density of dopamine 
receptors and are important for emotional motivation and cognitive processing (Alcaro 
et al., 2007; Hurd et al., 2001).  
 
Dopamine is best known for its role in the reward system (see section 2.2). 
Nevertheless, dopamine is not only part of the reward system it also plays an important 
role in mediating aggression (Kennealy, 2008; Nelson and Trainor, 2007). Enhanced 
dopamine activity increases impulsivity and aggression in subjects with normally 
functioning dopamine systems (Arce and Santisteban, 2006; Giammanco et al., 2005) 
and dopamine antagonists can be used clinically to treat aggression (Nelson and 
Trainor, 2007). Experimentally, it has been demonstrated that cocaine administration 
(increases dopamine levels) to healthy subjects increased aggression (Licata et al., 
1993). Licata et al. found that participants who had been treated with cocaine and lost a 
time reaction task, handed out greater electrical shocks (social punishment) to fellow 
competitors than placebo treated participants (Licata et al., 1993). The above findings 
suggest that there is a link between the dopamine system, aggression, and social 
punishment.  
 
Interestingly, reward circuitries are anatomically interconnected with emotional 
structures that mediate aggressive reactive responses (Iversen and Iversen, 2007) and 
this has been demonstrated on an experimental level. de Quervain et al. showed that the 
most punish-prone subjects in a social game setting had the highest brain activity in 
reward related circuits (de Quervain et al., 2004; Singer et al., 2006). Remarkably, 
social punishment of norm violators can be satisfying.  
 
In Study III, we investigated how dopamine administration affected social punishment 
in a socially interactive economic game (UG) (see section 2.4.3.2). In the UG there are 
   19 
two strong conflicting options presented to the responder; i.e. either to maximize 
his/her own monetary reward or enforce fairness by punishing the other player, at a 
personal cost, for treating him/her unfairly.  
 
2.2 REWARD 
Reward is fundamental for decision making and goal directed behaviors as it entails 
which outcome is associated with the greatest benefit. The reward system can be 
looked at from different perspectives; importantly the various views are not mutually 
exclusive but can co-exist. Common for all models is that they involve dopamine 
signaling.  
 
2.2.1 Liking and wanting 
Reward can be divided into two parts “liking” and “wanting.” Liking reflects the 
hedonic aspect of a stimulus and wanting accounts for the incentive salience that 
promotes approach and utilization of reward. Both liking and wanting are part of a 
reward system and during recent years research has shown that distinct 
neuroanatomical and neurochemical substrates separate them (Berridge et al., 2009). 
While liking has been associated with the opioid system, wanting has been linked to the 
dopamine system. The anatomical network for liking and wanting seems to be partly 
overlapping and partly separated (Berridge et al., 2009). The common denominator for 
both liking and wanting is that they involve the nucleus accumbens and the ventral 
pallidum; however, very specific parts of these structures respond to either liking or 
wanting (Berridge et al., 2009). 
 
Behavioral studies in humans seem to be in line with Berridge‟s theoretical framework 
e.g. it has been shown that healthy subjects who were given dopamine treatment 
preferred smaller but instant rewards to larger delayed rewards (Pine et al., 2010). This 
result can be interpreted as dopamine increases wanting. In addition, it has been 
suggested that dopamine can be viewed as a general reinforcer of motivational salience 
(Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2009). Hence, elevated levels of dopamine could therefore 
increase subjects wanting to act and not only increase the wanting of having something 
(e.g. food). Indeed, Berridge has suggested that an urge to act (action salience) can be 
equivalent to wanting an external stimulus (Berridge et al., 2009).   
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2.2.2 Reward prediction error signal 
Apart, from the dopamine system being involved in wanting, another line of work has 
proposed that dopamine participates in mediating the “reward prediction error signal” 
in reward learning (Schultz, 2000; Schultz, 2007). Dopamine has also been proposed to 
signal predictions of future rewards by evaluating the difference between expected 
rewards and the reward prediction signal (O'Doherty, 2004). 
 
2.2.3 Expected value 
Computational frame works have presented the importance of dopamine signaling in 
expected value computations (Fox and Poldrack, 2009).  
 
Expected value = probability of something to happen x value 
 
Expected value and reward prediction error signals are jointly important for how people 
perceive profits and losses. In one study, subjects played a 50-50 gamble where they in 
one version could win either $8 or $32 and in a second version, lose either $8 or $32. 
Subjects could not influence the game as it was a pure 50-50 gamble and their task was 
to report how they felt about the outcomes. Participants reported that they felt slightly 
happy when they lost $8 as they had avoided a loss of $32; in contrast, they felt rather 
unhappy when winning $8 as they had not won $32 (Peterson, 2007). Hence, the 
subjects‟ assessment of the true outcome versus the expected value guided how they 
felt about the end result.  
 
2.2.4 Reward circuitry 
There are a number of anatomical structures that participate in the neural processing of 
reward. As mentioned in earlier sections structures like amygdala, OFC, and ventral 
striatum (nucleus accumbens) are the most important areas as they integrate and 
process reward related information (O'Doherty, 2004; Schoenbaum et al., 2003). 
Common for all structures is that they receive dopaminergic input from VTA and SN 
which is important for conveying reward prediction error signals (Vallone et al., 2000).  
 
An excessive access to dopamine has shown to increase the temporal discounting rate 
and impulsive behavior (Pine et al., 2010; Voon et al., 2010a; Voon et al., 2010b). 
Stress seems to have similar effects as dopamine on impulsivity (Diller et al., 2011; van 
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den Bos et al., 2009; Voon et al., 2010a) and it is believed that this effect is due to 
glucocorticoid-induced stimulation of dopaminergic transmission (Piazza and Le Moal, 
1997). Over all, an imbalanced dopamine system results in impaired decision making. 
 
Pathological gamblers have an imbalance in their dopamine system (Reuter et al., 2005; 
Voon et al., 2007). In particular, they are more insensitive to rewards than healthy 
controls (van Holst et al., 2010). On a functional anatomical level, this insensitivity 
corresponds to a decreased neural response, compared to controls, in the ventral 
striatum and the vmPFC when receiving monetary gains (Reuter et al., 2005). Gamblers 
who have the most severe problems are also the ones showing the greatest decrease in 
ventral striatal activity (Reuter et al., 2005). Similarly, drug addicts also have a problem 
with impulsiveness and it has been shown that they have a steeper delayed discounting 
curve than healthy controls (Monterosso et al., 2007; Peters and Büchel, 2011). That is, 
they prefer short term rewards to long term rewards, in a much greater extent than 
healthy controls.  
 
2.3 DECISION MAKING 
2.3.1 Definition and function of decision making 
Decision making is defined as the cognitive process of selecting an outcome out of 
many alternatives (Coricelli et al., 2007). Every decision that we make results in a 
choice that either has a mental representation or is an actual action. The function of 
decision making is to help us adjust rapidly to new environments as we are constantly 
exposed to external information (Gospic et al., 2011). 
 
2.3.2 The link between decision making and emotions 
Emotions have shown to have a great impact on decision making and do indeed make 
us “irrational” according to economic theory. Early on, Tversky and Kahneman 
demonstrated that contextual framing (emotions) affects decisions e.g. if one is to 
choose between a certain reward outcome and a risky reward outcome (i.e. a suggestion 
presented with a certain probability) the majority will go for the certain alternative even 
though the risky choice has the same expected outcome. In contrast, when we are to 
choose between a certain loss and a risky loss we go for the risky loss (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1981). Thus, depending on if we are facing rewards or losses we behave 
differently as we let ourselves be guided by our emotions. 
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In the 90‟s Antonio Damasio presented his “somatic marker hypothesis” on how 
emotional processes affect decision making (Damasio, 1994). The theory emerged from 
observations of patients suffering from brain lesions; it was noted that patients suffering 
from frontal brain lesions made decisions against their best interests (Bechara and 
Damasio, 2005). To investigate this phenomenon further, Damasio et al. studied these 
patients during a card game (Iowa gambling task). Damasio el al. demonstrated that 
those patients with lesions in amygdala and vmPFC made more risky choices and their 
overall monetary gain was less compared to controls. When skin conductance response 
(SCR) was measured, it was shown that control subjects elevated their SCR prior to 
choosing a risky card deck whereas this response was abolished in amygdala and 
vmPFC lesioned patients. From these results it was concluded that these patients were 
not guided by any emotional signals. Hence, Damasio demonstrated that an emotional 
process guides decision making and contributes to advantageous choice behavior 
(Bechara and Damasio, 2005).  
 
There are various studies showing how emotions affect choice behavior. Depending on 
how we evaluate/reappraise a situation we can affect loss aversion. For example, if a 
potentially risky choice is considered as one choice out of many we tend to be less risk 
aversive. On the contrary, if we consider an individual choice as the only choice, 
people tend to be more loss aversive (Curley et al., 2007). Our feeling states also 
modulate our selling behavior. Lerner et al. showed that participants who were sad 
tended to sell their goods for a lower price and buy goods at a higher price (reduced 
endowment effect) than they would if they had a neutral mood (Lerner et al., 2004). On 
a related note, angry subjects in comparison to fearful subjects were more prone to 
make risk-seeking choices (Lerner and Keltner, 2001).  
 
2.3.3 Neural mechanisms of decision making 
All decisions are associated with an uncertainty, an expected value, and short versus 
long term rewards (Rushworth and Behrens, 2008; Tobler et al., 2009). The neural 
mechanisms of uncertainty, expected value and reward, involve emotional processing. 
Hsu et al showed that the level of ambiguity correlated positively with amygdala and 
OFC activity, and negatively with the striatum (Hsu et al., 2005). Moreover, expected 
value was guided by the striatum to ensure maximal gain (Hsu et al., 2005).  
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Several animal species favor short term rewards as they lack the ability to plan for the 
future (Stuphorn, 2005). The ambiguity of not knowing when to access food e.g. makes 
them act instantly. A similar behavior can be observed in children but as the frontal 
lobes evolve with age, individuals are able to consider long term rewards and future 
aspects (Fuster, 2008). Still, people struggle between the conflict of short and long term 
reward (Gilbert and Wilson, 2007; McClure et al., 2004). For example, subjects prefer 
$10 immediately to $11 tomorrow; in contrast, if subjects are offered $10 in a year or 
$11 in one year and one day, subjects do not mind waiting an extra day for the extra 
dollar (McClure et al., 2004). Conclusively, the time factor (temporal discounting) 
influences how much we are willing to post pone reward.  
 
Many studies have shown the importance of emotional processes in decision making. 
Damasio et al. demonstrated that amygdala, OFC and vmPFC are important for 
accurate risk behavior as patients with lesions in these structures had increased risk 
seeking behavior (Bechara et al., 2003). De Martino et al. demonstrated that amygdala 
participates in the framing effect, previously described by Tversky et al. (De Martino et 
al., 2010; De Martino et al., 2006; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). Interestingly, 
DeMartino et al. also demonstrated that patients with amygdala lesions are not affected 
by the framing effect as amygdala damage eliminates monetary loss aversion (De 
Martino et al., 2010).  
 
Neural reward circuits are also important for decision making as we prefer the choices 
that maximize our gain (reward). For example, observing products that we like 
activates subcortical brain regions like nucleus accumbens (Knutson et al., 2008) and 
cortical regions such as vmPFC cortex (Paulus and Frank, 2003), both related to 
emotional reward processing in terms of wanting and liking (Berridge and Kringelbach, 
2008; Kringelbach and Berridge, 2009) (see section 2.2.1). Activity in these regions, 
together with insula, are also predictive of purchase (Knutson et al., 2007). 
 
2.3.4 A model for decision making 
There is an abundant amount of theoretical models by which attempts have been made 
to explain human decision making. In the present thesis we have adopted the two-level 
model presented by Gläscher et al. (Gläscher et al., 2010). Therefore, only the two-level 
model will be presented below. 
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2.3.4.1 Two-level model 
The model by Gläscher et al. entails that there is model-free reinforcement learning 
(RL) and model-based RL. The model-free RL system denotes that action values are 
learned directly by trial and error without creating any model of the surrounding 
environment. In contrast, model-based RL refers to a system that learns action values 
by building and using a cognitive map/model of the environment. Additionally, 
prediction errors are important for both approaches but in different manners (Gläscher 
et al., 2010).  
 
By combining computational learning models with functional imaging data Gläscher et 
al. found that model-free RL was associated with subcortical processing and model-
based RL was linked to cortical processing. Gläscher et al. suggests that decision 
making involves at least two neural networks that seem to have distinct neural 
correlates. As a result, both sub-cortical and cortical levels may influence the decision 
making and the major difference is that the cortical level has a richer representation of 
future outcomes of a decision (Fuster, 2008; Gläscher et al., 2010; Pezzulo and Rigoli, 
2011). These two functional anatomical entities are also linked to an evolutionary 
hierarchy where instant automatic processes are driven by phylogenetically older 
structures (subcortical) whereas contemplated actions are processed by 
phylogenetically younger structures (cortex) (Fuster, 2008; Kolb and Whishaw, 2003; 
LeDoux, 1999).  
 
In Study II and III, we suggest that instant social punishment (rejection) is amygdala 
driven whereas a slower and more contemplated rejection decision is more cortically 
driven (Sanfey et al., 2003). In Study IV, we generalize this idea and suggest that 
instant real decisions are subcortically driven while contemplated hypothetical 
decisions are more cortically driven. An alternative view on our implemented two-level 
model would be to introduce an intermediate level represented by insula and OFC. The 
hierarchy would then be: subcortical, intermediate and cortical. We call this the 
modified two-level model (see section 6.8). This idea would be in agreement with both 
the evolution and the development of the brain (Singer, 2006). The purpose of adding a 
third level would be to stratify instant reactive processes from fast salient emotional 
processes. Both are rapid responses but instant reactive responses can trigger an 
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immediate behavior whereas fast salient responses are on the border of not being fully 
automatic and not being fully contemplated.   
 
Other important aspects in our model have been to emphasize the importance of time 
and positive and negative consequences associated with a single choice (Gospic et al., 
2011). Every decision entails a short and a long term aspect and each aspect has pros 
and cons. This means that even though a person faces a choice that requires a simple 
“yes” or “no” answer (like in the UG), a particular choice needs to be considered in 
these dimensions. Animals that are mostly subcortically driven and lack the ability of 
projecting themselves in the future make decisions on a subcortical level (Stuphorn, 
2005); nonetheless, these decisions may still account for some future consequences 
linked to the choice even though the animal does not perceive these per se at the time of 
the decision.  
 
In previous standard economic models, one has only considered the aspects of hyper-
rationality and pay-off maximization which has entailed that some money (reward) is 
more than no money (no reward) (Güth et al., 1982); however, these models have not 
considered other aspects that may influence choice behavior e.g. the importance of 
implementing fairness or maintaining a good reputation (Camerer, 2003). Hence, our 
anatomy-informed model adds new information to a previous economic model that has 
not fully considered how anatomical hierarchies, time, and different kinds of 
consequences affect human choice behavior (see also section 6.8 and Table 1). 
 
2.3.5 Rationality  
The definitions of rationality are many and the discussion around the concept of 
rationality has been topical since Aristotle (Hutchinson, 1986). One way of 
summarizing rationality is: “rationality involves thinking and behaving reasonably or 
logically. Rational beliefs are those that are internally consistent, and rational 
arguments are those that obey the rules of logic” (Colman, 2003). 
 
The economic science defines rational behavior as: “the recommendation always to 
behave so as to maximize the expected time utility per time unit” (Good, 1952). 
Economic rationality of utility, as derived from classical game theory, predicts that the 
participants, in experimental economic games, should always maximize their payoff 
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(Von Neumann et al., 1953). In real life, this prediction is only true for autistic persons 
(Sally and Hill, 2006) and brain lesioned patients (Shiv et al., 2005). Behavioral 
studies, in healthy control subjects, have shown that the economic rationality of utility 
prediction is experimentally invalid. In fact, decision making processes in healthy 
control subjects are influenced by a number of factors e.g. emotions (Bechara et al., 
2003; De Martino et al., 2006; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981).  
 
In recent years, neural correlates of economic “irrationality” have been studied with the 
framing effect paradigm. In this paradigm participants are presented risky monetary 
gains, risky monetary losses, safe monetary gains and safe monetary losses (De 
Martino et al., 2006). Overall, participants prefer safe gains to risky gains even though 
they have the same expected value. In contrast, when participants are presented to 
alternatives that involve losses, they are more prone to be risky even though the 
alternatives have the same expected value (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). These 
behaviors are, according to economic theory, irrational as two equal outcomes that have 
the same probability to occur should not be treated differently (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1981).  
 
In a study by De Martino et al. they investigated neural correlates of the framing effect 
(De Martino et al., 2006; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). Interestingly, they found that 
neural correlates of rationality, in contrast to emotional processes, were cortically 
located. They showed that people who were the least affected by the framing effect had 
enhanced activity in orbital and medial PFC and vmPFC (De Martino et al., 2006). In 
contrast, activity related to “irrationality” and the actual framing effect was associated 
with amygdala activity. Two studies have investigated the effect of amygdala lesion on 
the framing effect; one study showed that amygdala lesions abolished the framing 
effect (De Martino et al., 2010) whereas the other study did not (Talmi et al., 2009). 
The reason for the latter result may be that the amygdala lesioned model they used 
(Urbach-Wiethe disease) was not a pure model of amygdala lesion or amygdala does 
not play a causal role in the framing effect (Talmi et al., 2009).  
 
The emotional network seems to be important for “irrational” behavior. Greene et al. 
showed that participants who were are asked to judge the appropriateness of two 
similar alternatives in a moral dilemma with identical outcomes, activated emotional 
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networks when the action was personal compared to impersonal (Frith and Singer, 
2008; Greene et al., 2001). In contrast, cortical structures appear to be important for 
“rational” behavior. A couple of studies have shown that patients with lesions in the 
vmPFC behave more irrationally in economic games than control subjects (Bechara et 
al., 1998; Koenigs and Tranel, 2007; Moretti et al., 2009).  
 
In conclusion, the above mentioned studies make it evident that emotional processing 
affects decision making and contributes to “economic irrationality.” On the other hand, 
as “irrationality” has survived evolutionary selection, it is valid to question what 
rationality really is. One distinction to make is that one could classify rationality 
according to economic rationality versus biological rationality. The biological 
rationality would then entail the choice(s) that is/are most likely to increase the survival 
of the organism which may be a decision that is emotionally biased. Previous 
definitions have omitted the time aspect that is associated with all choices. For 
example, one decision may be very rational from a short term perspective but may not 
be as rational from a long term perspective. A way to exemplify this is with economic 
games, where rational behavior is considered to be the choices that maximize one‟s 
monetary pay-off. Notably, this view does not consider aspects important for future 
interactions e.g. the importance of implementing social rules and reputation building 
(Camerer, 2003). 
 
2.3.6 Other factors biasing decision making 
There are a vast number of factors that may affect decision making (Anderson and 
Dickinson, 2010; Güroglu et al., 2010; Heine et al., 2008; Henrich et al., 2005; 
Symmonds et al., 2010). The section above presented the most important factor of them 
all i.e. emotional bias. In the following paragraphs a few additional concepts will be 
presented to give a broader perspective on how easily affected our decisions are, from 
instant changes in bodily homeostasis to more permanent variations in our genetic code 
(Roiser et al., 2009; Symmonds et al., 2010).  
 
Body homeostasis, like sleep status and metabolic state, influence choice behavior. For 
example, subjects who have been sleep-deprived are more likely to reject unequal splits 
in the UG compared to subjects who have slept. Sleep deprived subjects do also trust 
others less in a trust game compared to subjects who have slept (Anderson and 
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Dickinson, 2010). Symmonds et al. demonstrated that a person‟s metabolic state can 
alter economic decision making under risk. Interestingly, participants who had just 
eaten made more risky choices compared to before the meal (Symmonds et al., 2010).  
 
The concept of time is an influential factor on decision making (Gilbert and Wilson, 
2007; McClure et al., 2004; Smith and Silberberg, 2010). Our own mental 
representation of an event in relation to the time when it will occur influences decisions 
in the sense that the further away in time the event is the more positive we are. This is 
due to that when we imagine an event e.g. attending a lecture distant in time, we 
usually consider the positive parts like the lecture itself. However, as the lecture 
approaches we start considering how to get there etc. which might make us less 
enthusiastic to attend (Gilbert and Wilson, 2007).  
 
Smith et al. demonstrated that participants playing the UG (see section 2.4.3.2) made 
different decisions depending on if they waited 1 minute or 5 minutes before they made 
their choice (Smith and Silberberg, 2010). After 1 minute of waiting, participants 
favored rejection over pay-off maximization but when participants had waited 5 
minutes before they replied they favored to maximize their monetary profit. 
Importantly, the pay-off maximization behavior observed in autistic people, brain 
lesioned patients, and Chimpanzees (Jensen et al., 2007; Sally and Hill, 2006; Shiv et 
al., 2005) can be reproduced in healthy controls, provided that the temporal domain is 
manipulated accordingly (Smith and Silberberg, 2010).   
 
Other people‟s intentions affect decision making (Güroglu et al., 2010); subjects who 
played the UG rejected unfair offers more frequently when the proposer had a fair 
alternative to offer. In line with this concept a number of studies have shown that 
playing the UG with a computer decreases the rejection rate of unfair proposals (Sanfey 
et al., 2003) while a similar interaction in the prisoner‟s dilemma game (see section 
2.4.3.4) results in decreased cooperation (Rilling et al., 2004).  
 
The representation that we picture others to have of us can change choice behavior. 
Heine et al. 2008 studied the way westerners (Americans) compared to South-East 
Asian (Japanese) subjects evaluated themselves. Subjects performed a self-evaluation 
task in front of a mirror and in a room with no mirror (without knowing that the mirror 
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played a part in the experiment). Results showed that the self-evaluation performed in 
front of the mirror was much harsher compared to the self-evaluation made in a room 
without a mirror (Heine et al., 2008). The authors suggested that this change in choice 
behavior was due to perspective taking i.e. how you see yourself compared to how 
others see you. Interestingly, this effect was only present in Americans and not in 
Japanese subjects indicating that cultural norms play a role in perspective taking and 
decision making.  
 
In recent years, there have been several studies that have shown that genetic variations 
influence decision making (Cesarini et al., 2008; Dreber et al., 2009; Knafo et al., 2008; 
Krugel et al., 2009; Reuter et al., 2010; Roiser et al., 2009; Zhong et al., 2010). For 
example, it has been shown that homozygote carriers of the short allele of the serotonin 
transporter gene (5-HTTLPR)(more serotonin in the synaptic cleft) are more prone to 
choose safe options than risky options, compared to homozygote long allele carriers 
(less serotonin in the synaptic cleft) (Roiser et al., 2009). Moreover, the long allele 
carriers had an increased coupling between amygdala and ACC when they made risky 
options compared to short allele carries. Thus, variations in functional anatomical 
coupling may be one of the underlying mechanisms that explain how genetic variations 
may influence choice behavior.  
 
2.3.7 Risk, ambiguity, loss aversion and trust 
Risk and ambiguity are two factors that impact decision making (Singer et al., 2009). 
Risk means that the participant is aware of the risk his/her choice has e.g. when 
drawing a card from a deck with a known composition. Ambiguity means that a subject 
is unaware of the card deck composition, meaning that if s/he draws a card from that 
deck the chance of getting a specific card is unknown.  
 
Hsu et al. showed that different neural mechanisms are involved in ambiguity versus 
risk (Hsu et al., 2005). Increased amygdala activity and OFC activity was seen during 
ambiguous choices versus risky choices while increased striatal activity was observed 
during risky choices compared to ambiguous choices (Hsu et al., 2005). Interestingly, it 
was also demonstrated that patients with lesions in the OFC were indifferent to risk and 
ambiguity. In a similar manner, amygdala lesioned patients are also known to be risk 
and ambiguity neutral (Brand et al., 2007; De Martino et al., 2010). AI has also been 
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suggested to be involved in risk and ambiguity processing (Singer et al., 2009) and 
insula lesioned patients show impaired decision making (Weller et al., 2009). Yet the 
results from Weller et al. are more complex and may be due to inconsistencies in the 
location of lesion, lesion size and comorbid effects. Importantly, these results suggest 
that human decision making depends on an intact insula (Singer et al., 2009; Weller et 
al., 2009).  
 
Loss aversion is closely related to risk as a risky choice may involve a potential loss. In 
general, people tend to be more sensitive to losses than gains. Subjects reject gamble 
proposals that state a 50/50 chance of gaining or losing money, unless the gain is twice 
the amount of loss (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Recently, this behavioral 
phenomenon was linked to functional neuroanatomical correlates. Indeed, it was 
demonstrated that the response curve in striatum was steeper and negative for losses 
compared to gains where the response was more blunt and positive (Tom et al., 2007).  
 
Trust is constituted by a certain expectation of someone and is closely related to risk as 
increased trust in someone is associated to a lower risk. Brain imaging studies have 
demonstrated that the perception of trust is closely related to amygdala (Winston et al., 
2002). Kosfeld et al. demonstrated that trustworthiness could be manipulated by the 
neuropeptide oxytocin (Kosfeld et al., 2005). Subjects who received oxytocin tended to 
trust and be more willing to take risk arising from social interactions. This phenomenon 
is probably due to the fact that oxytocin decreases amygdala activity/output (Debiec, 
2005; Huber et al., 2005; Petrovic et al., 2008). In support, a lesion study showed that  
amygdala damage led to increased trust (Adolphs et al., 1998).  
 
2.4 COOPERATION AND PUNISHMENT 
2.4.1 Cooperation 
Cooperation is found at different levels in nature and is a prerequisite for evolution to 
create new civilizations (Nowak and Sigmund, 2005). Humans have an exceptional 
ability to cooperate and this behavior can be observed both in modern societies as well 
as within groups of hunters/gathers (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). A unique feature of 
human cooperation is that we collaborate with others that we are not genetically related 
to (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Henrich, 2003). This behavior to cooperate with 
genetically different individuals is only found in humans, bees and ants (Fehr and 
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Fischbacher, 2003). The evolution of collaborative skills and the ability to sustain 
cooperation rely on several functions unique to humans e.g. patience, precise numerical 
discrimination, working memory capacity, and inhibitory control (Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2004). The incentives for cooperation are many, but reputation building 
and reciprocal gains may be considered to be two of the most important. Reputation 
building is part of an indirect reciprocity model where third parties reward other group 
members with a good status, provided that they can get a good reputation themselves 
by doing so (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). Reciprocal gains are based on reciprocal 
altruism where reward and punishment are executed if there is a long term interest for 
doing so (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). Both these factors can be observed in games 
where players have repeated interactions.  
 
2.4.2 Punishment 
Punishment and the threat of punishment is an influential tool to maintain social 
cooperation (Jensen, 2010) and discourage norm violators (Fehr and Fischbacher, 
2004). A common repertoire of human behavior is to punish other individuals who 
break social norms set by the group. The act of punishment serves to protect both 
personal and group interests (Seymour et al., 2007). It is  also a crucial part of sustained 
cooperation (Binmore, 2008).  
 
A number of social interactive paradigms can be used to study cooperation and 
punishment. The following sections will describe the rules and experimental findings of 
the four most commonly used games i.e. the public goods game, the dictator game 
(DG), the UG, and the prisoner‟s dilemma. In Study II and III, we used the UG to study 
neural mechanisms of fairness and social punishment.  
 
2.4.3 Paradigms to study cooperation and punishment  
2.4.3.1 Public goods game 
The public goods game is a classical game to study social cooperation and punishment. 
In this game, every player is provided with a sum of money; every player has the 
choice to either contribute to a public fund or keep their money. If a player chooses to 
invest the money in the public fund this money will be multiplied by a predetermined 
factor and then distributed to all the players participating in the game. The greatest 
group benefit is that every individual invests money in the public fund. Nonetheless, 
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the biggest benefit for the individual is to defect (free-ride) because then the individual 
will both keep his/her own money and receive money from the public fund in which 
other players invested in. When players are allowed to punish the free-riders, the norm 
violators quickly adapt to the rules of the group and start investing in the public fund. 
With punishment the free-rider problem can be avoided and a new game equilibrium is 
reached (Seymour et al., 2007).  
 
2.4.3.2 Ultimatum Game 
The UG is a simple illustration of altruistic punishment and studies the participants‟ 
proneness to punish (Güth et al., 1982). In the UG a proposer suggests how to split a 
sum of money between him/herself and a subject (responder).  The offers can be either 
fair or unfair and the responder can choose either to accept or reject the monetary split. 
If the responder accepts the offer the suggested split will be realized in terms of real 
money. In contrast, if the responder rejects the offer neither of the two receives any 
money. Interestingly, responders tend to reject unfair 20/80 offers (20 % to the 
responder and 80% to the proposer) approximately 50% of the time, even at a personal 
cost (Camerer, 2003; Gospic et al., 2011; Sanfey et al., 2003).  
 
The UG can be played either repeatedly or with single interactions. In the former 
situation proposers adjust their behavior towards more fairness if they are punished by 
the responder and it is beneficial for the responder him/herself to punish the proposer as 
this will yield a fairer split in the coming interactions (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). 
The responder will have incentives to build his/her reputation in the eyes of the 
proposer and the social group (Camerer, 2003). Similar behavior is seen in single shot 
games when the proposer knows that his/her previous behavior will not be reported to 
the upcoming responder (Gospic et al., 2011). According to economic theories there is 
no reason for the proposer to play fair in single shot interactions as the players will 
never meet again. Nonetheless, an abundant number of studies (Gospic et al., 2011; 
Sanfey et al., 2003), have observed that proposers still cooperate in single shot 
interactions and concluded that humans are strong reciprocals meaning that they reward 
others for cooperating (altruistic reward) and punish norm violators (altruistic 
punishment) (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). This behavior 
creates incentive to cooperate even during single interaction or when reputation gains 
are absent.  
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An important aspect to consider when playing the UG is which incentives participants 
have to play the game. Smith demonstrated in the early 60‟s that behavior differed 
between participants who were rewarded with points and participants who were 
rewarded with real money (Camerer, 2003). Subjects who were rewarded with fictional 
points tended to behave unpredictably as they got bored by the experiment. In contrast, 
participants who receive real money tended to behave more consistently and did not get 
bored as easily as participants receiving fictional points. Consequently, paying 
participants became a norm within experimental economics.  
 
2.4.3.3 Dictator Game 
The DG has been used to investigate if humans still maintain a high level of 
cooperation in the UG when the responder is not allowed to punish the proposer. The 
DG is similar to the UG with one exception; the recipients are not allowed to respond to 
the offers i.e. the recipients are basically given an amount of money by the proposers 
(Sanfey  and Dorris, 2009). According to economic theory the proposers should 
maximize their own monetary pay-off i.e. giving no money to the recipients, but 
experiments have shown that the proposers still share some money (pure altruism) with 
the recipients. The offers made by the proposers to the recipients in the DG are 40% 
smaller compared to the offers made in the UG (Camerer, 2003). This indicates that 
punishment is a prerequisite to sustain high level cooperation. The fact that the 
proposers still offer the recipients an amount of money suggests that part of the motive 
when making fair proposals in the UG is altruistic and not purely strategical (Camerer, 
2003).  
 
2.4.3.4 Prisoner’s dilemma  
Previous brain imaging studies have used the “prisoners‟ dilemma” to study human 
cooperation (Rilling et al., 2002). In the prisoners‟ dilemma two participants 
independently from each other choose whether to cooperate or not. There are 4 possible 
outcomes: player A and player B can both choose to cooperate, defect, or one of them 
may choose to cooperate while the other one may defect. If both players choose to 
cooperate they will both be rewarded. If player A chooses to defect while player B 
chooses to cooperate player A will be rewarded and vice versa. If both players choose 
to defect they will be harshly punished. Hence, depending on player B‟s decision the 
individual (player A) will either be rewarded or not. 
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2.4.4 Neural correlates of cooperation  
In a study by Rilling et al. it was demonstrated that mutual cooperation between two 
human partners in the prisoner‟s dilemma activated rACC, OFC, and anteroventral 
striatum (Rilling et al., 2002). From these results, the authors interpreted that social 
cooperation is rewarding and cortical control is used to inhibit selfish inputs.  
  
2.4.5 Neural correlates of punishment 
Social punishment is a must to maintain social cooperation and interestingly, the act of 
punishment has been shown to be satisfying. de Querivan et al. found that the most 
punish-prone subjects in a social trust game setting had the highest brain activity in 
reward related circuits (de Quervain et al., 2004; Singer et al., 2006). In particular, 
striatal activity correlated positively with the act of punishment. The authors concluded 
that the reward system participates in altruistic punishment and caudate activation 
especially, may reflect the anticipated satisfaction from punishing defectors. This result 
gives an indication of why people may be prone to punish social norm violators.  
 
Amygdala is crucial for both the mediation of aggressive responses (Bosch and 
Neumann, 2010; Ferris et al., 2008; Hermans et al., 2008; Mehta and Beer, 2010) and 
of biasing decision making (Adolphs et al., 1998; Bechara et al., 2003; De Martino et 
al., 2006). Reactive aggressive actions are automatic and present when we react to 
challenging situations like localizing danger, competing for resources and establishing 
social dominance (Archer, 2009; Giammanco et al., 2005). The UG is an economic 
game reflecting these aspects, i.e. two individuals competing for the same resource and 
trying to establish a good reputation. Interestingly, it has been showed that anger is a 
better predictor of rejection behavior than fairness in the UG (Pillutla and Murnighan, 
1996). Moreover, amygdala involvement has been observed in third party punishment. 
Buckholtz et al. showed that subjects who were to decide upon appropriate 
punishments for crimes (third party punishment) activated areas involved in emotional 
processing i.e. amygdala, mPFC, and posterior cingulate. In Study II and III, we 
hypothesized that amygdala would be involved in social punishment in the UG.  
 
2.5 FAIRNESS AND UNFAIRNESS 
Fairness and unfairness are two words that stand in close relation as they are each 
other‟s counterparts. Fairness can be defined as: reasonableness, equitableness, 
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impartiality and unfairness may be defined as unreasonableness, inequitableness and 
bias (Longman, 1993). Even though the definitions of fairness and unfairness are rather 
clear, their neural underpinnings are less understood. Nevertheless, an amount of 
studies have examined these concepts in different cultures, patient cohorts, species (e.g. 
Capuchin monkey), and age groups (Almås et al., 2010; Brosnan and de Waal, 2003; 
Fehr et al., 2008; Henrich et al., 2005; Koenigs and Tranel, 2007).  
 
2.5.1 Neural correlates of fairness and unfairness 
Neural correlates of fairness and unfairness have mainly been studied with the UG and 
brain imaging. In the UG, perception of fairness, compared to unfairness, has been 
associated with neural activity in ventral striatum, amygdala, and OFC (Tabibnia et al., 
2008). The opposite contrast, i.e. unfairness versus fairness, has been shown to activate 
amygdala, bilateral insula, dlPFC, and ACC (Gospic et al., 2011; Sanfey et al., 2003).  
 
Recently there has been a discussion whether concepts of fairness/unfairness 
necessarily need to have a cortical representation as extensive literature on decision 
making related to inequality has shown that actions to implement justice (rejecting 
unfair proposals in the UG) can be cortically independent. For example, behavioral 
studies in children, with a less developed prefrontal cortex, have shown that inequity 
aversion is present in the absence of “theory of mind” (Takagishi et al., 2010). 
Similarly, Capuchin monkeys (Brosnan and de Waal, 2003), and patients with 
prefrontal lesions (Koenigs and Tranel, 2007) also show an intact rejection response to 
unfair offers. In Study II and III, we presented a model where we reconcile the views of 
cortical and subcortical functions related to fairness and social punishment. 
Concomitantly, we also investigated subcortical substrates of fairness and social 
punishment.   
 
Perception of fairness has also been studied with an inequity paradigm; in a study by 
Tricomi et al. subjects were divided in to two groups, one of the groups received $50 
while the other group received $20. Subjects were then asked to transfer money 
between each other/groups. Interestingly, the low paid group showed increased reward 
related activity (i.e. in striatum and vmPFC) when the money was transferred to them 
while the high paid group showed the same kind of neural activity when money was 
transferred to a subject in the low paid group. This indicates that there are neural 
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correlates for advantageous and disadvantageous inequality (Tricomi et al., 2010) and 
the neural activity in striatum seems to reflect different things in each group. Izuma et 
al. has shown that both social rewards and monetary rewards share neural correlates 
(Izuma et al., 2008). Therefore, the striatal activity in the low paid group might have 
reflected a pure monetary gain while the corresponding activity in the high paid group 
may have mirrored a social reward.  
 
2.5.2 Factors affecting concepts of fairness and unfairness 
A great number of factors can affect fairness and social punishment. People from 
different cultures can act very differently in the UG. Populations in Peru have been 
shown to give very unfair proposals and accepting unfair proposals to a greater extent 
than people in western cultures. Interestingly, these populations are some of the few 
that in fact act as game theory predicts! In contrast, groups in Papua New Guinea give 
hyperfair proposals and show a greater rejection rate to unfair proposals (Henrich, 
Boyd et al. 2005). People in western cultures tend to give and accept proposals close to 
50-50. Personality traits do also affect behavior in the UG and the DG. For example, 
schizotype personalities, compared to healthy controls, offer more money in the UG 
and DG and accept more unfair offers (van 't Wout and Sanfey 2011).  
 
2.5.3 Development of fairness and unfairness 
Behavioral studies made in children have offered the opportunity to study the 
development of fairness. In an influential study by Fehr et al., they let children share 
pieces of candy with other children in three different contexts (Fehr et al., 2008). First, 
in the “prosocial context” the child could choose one candy for him/herself and one 
candy for the partner (1,1) or one candy for him/herself and no candy for the partner 
(1,0). Second, in the “envy context” the child could choose one candy for him/herself 
and one candy for the partner (1,1) or one candy for him/herself and two candies for the 
partner (1,2) .Third, in the “sharing context” the child could choose one candy for 
him/herself and one candy for the partner (1,1) or two candies for him/herself and zero 
candy for the partner (2,0). Interestingly, they demonstrated that children at the age of 
3-4 behaved selfishly, children at the age of 5-6 were intermediate and children at the 
age of 7-8 had a strong sense of fairness as they choose the “1,1” conditions most often. 
Children without siblings were more likely to share than children with siblings and the 
youngest child of a family was less likely to share than children with younger siblings.  
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Almås et al. demonstrated that elderly children (11-19 years old) playing the DG did 
not show any differences in mean share (Almås et al., 2010). The degree of selfishness 
was also similar over all age groups. However, with age they noted that the acceptance 
for inequalities in performance increased whereas the youngest participants were strict 
egalitarians i.e. considering all inequalities to be unfair. These results indicate that 
cognitive maturation and social experience can bias the concept of fairness preferences.  
 
2.6 ALTRUISM 
Altruism can be defined as selfless care for others or a behavior that is costly to the 
actor and beneficial to the recipient (www.dictionary.com). Hence, altruism deviates 
from economic beliefs of profit maximization. From a biological aspect, altruism 
means that the actor increases the chance of someone else to reproduce while lowering 
its own chances (Glimcher, 2008). There are different motives that might explain this 
kind of behavior e.g. warm-glow and signaling of wealth and prestige (Glimcher, 2008; 
Harbaugh et al., 2007).  
 
Within the animal kingdom altruism is usually exerted towards relatives, this has been 
considered as beneficial as the actor and the recipient share ancestry. Nevertheless, 
humans seem to be one of few species that exerts altruistic behavior to non-genetically 
related individuals (Henrich, 2003) and the question why we display this kind of 
behavior is still not clear.  Brain imaging studies have shown that donating money to 
charity activates structures involved in reward processing i.e. ventral striatum 
(Harbaugh et al., 2007; Hare et al., 2010; Izuma et al., 2010) and emotional regulation 
i.e. ACC (Moll et al., 2006). These studies indicate that altruism is rewarding.  
 
2.7 HYPOTHETICAL BIAS 
When people state their willingness to pay for something, the amount differs from the 
behavior when faced with a real purchase (Johannesson et al., 1998). The difference, 
between a hypothetical reply and the real act is called hypothetical bias (Johansson-
Stenman and Svedsäter, 2007; Kang et al., 2011). The underlying reasons to this fact 
are multifaceted. For example, real choices have a cost for the decision maker. Thus, 
when we make a real choice we have to deal with the direct comparison between a loss 
(e.g. money or time) and the gain (e.g. goods or favors). In contrast, hypothetical 
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choices do not cost anything in real terms and we do not have to face any particular 
consequences (Kang et al., 2011).   
 
2.7.1 Neural correlates of hypothetical bias 
There has only been one previous study, to our knowledge, that has studied the neural 
correlates of hypothetical bias. In the study by Kang et al. they demonstrate that the 
same neural network (i.e. mOFC, ventral striatum and ACC) was involved in both real 
and hypothetical decisions but the activity in this neural network was more expressed 
for real decisions compared to hypothetical decisions. In Study IV, we continued to 
investigate underlying mechanisms of hypothetical bias. In contrast to the study by 
Kang et al., our study design was considerably sharper as it had a precision timing for 
the actual decision, involved public goods, and had a between group design.  
 
2.7.2 Factors that affect hypothetical bias 
A number of factors can affect the degree of hypothetical bias. From a methodological 
point of view it is important to know that hypothetical bias tends to be greater in 
between subjects comparisons compared to within subject comparisons (Johansson-
Stenman and Svedsäter, 2008). Participants also value products differently depending 
on if they have a known market price (i.e. private goods) or not (i.e. public goods). For 
example, it is easy to know that a pair of brand sneakers is a bargain if they are sold for 
$10 while it is harder to know the value of three square meters of a national park. 
Therefore, hypothetical bias is usually higher for public goods, than for private goods, 
as they lack value anchors (Murphy et al., 2005).    
 
Certainty ratings of how sure participants are of their hypothetical choices tend to 
abolish hypothetical bias (Blumenschein et al., 2008) and hypothetical bias seems to 
increase with the degree of uncertainty (Ladenburg and Olsen Boye, 2010). 
Hypothetical bias can also vary with culture, in both directions. That is, in some 
cultures (e.g. western cultures) people tend to exaggerate their hypothetical choices 
compared to their real choices whereas in some African cultures the situation is 
reversed; that is, the hypothetical choices are understated in comparison to the real 
choices (Ehmke et al., 2008).  
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2.7.3 Donation paradigms  
A variety of experimental set-ups can be used to study hypothetical bias. A commonly 
used paradigm is a donation task. In this task, participants are either allocated to a 
“real” group or a “hypothetical” group, in a between group design. As a show-up fee, 
all participants are given an amount of money. Participants are then presented to a 
number of proposals e.g. “You donate $10, we donate $5.” The proposals contain a co-
donation by the lab (we) as it is an incentive for the participant to donate money inside 
the experiment and not after the experiment.  
 
In the real group, participants make decisions that can have a cost for them. That is, if 
they choose to accept a donation proposal, the stated amount will be paid by both the 
participant and the lab (provided that the particular proposal is randomly selected to be 
realized). On the other hand, if they choose to decline a proposal no money will be 
paid. In the hypothetical group, the participants make similar decisions but with the 
exception that no costs will be associated with their decisions as they are only 
hypothetical. In Study IV, we adapted a version of this donation task to study neural 
mechanisms underlying hypothetical bias.  
 
2.7.3.1 Factors affecting donation  
There are a great number of factors that influence donation behavior. Field experiments 
have shown that revealing the name of the donor makes people donate more money and 
previous donors are more likely to give and contribute more than first time donors 
(Landry et al., 2008). The physical attractiveness of a fundraiser also affects the raised 
amounts and this variable is at least as important as any economic incentives offered 
(Landry et al., 2006). 
 
A recent imaging study on the topic revealed that participants donated more money to 
charities when they were observed; concomitantly, these donations yielded a higher 
neural activity in the striatum (Izuma et al., 2010). Personal monetary gain without a 
social cost (i.e. not being observed) also yielded increased striatal activation. These 
findings indicate that social rewards may be as rewarding as pure monetary rewards. It 
also implies that the brain uses a common currency to evaluate these two different 
modalities.  
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Recently, studies have indicated that genetic polymorphisms may affect donation 
behavior (Knafo et al., 2008; Reuter et al., 2010). Reuter et al. investigated the 
influence of the COMT Val158 polymorphism, (an enzyme metabolizing dopamine) on 
donation behavior (Reuter et al., 2010). They demonstrated that subjects carrying at 
least one copy of the Val allele (i.e. having an increased enzyme activity and less 
available dopamine in the synaptic cleft) donated almost twice as much money as 
carriers of Met/Met (Reuter et al., 2010). This indicates that genetic variability affecting 
the brain‟s neurochemical balance can influence donation behavior.   
 
2.8 SEX DIFFERENCES  
A number of studies have noted sex differences between males and females in brain 
anatomy and function (Hines, 2010). However, there is a great inconsistency in the 
literature concerning sex differences, especially in the economic literature (Eckel and 
Grossman, 2008). Observed sex differences may be due to both nature and nurture (i.e. 
culture) as game behavior and risk taking belong very much to the cultural domain 
(Henrich et al., 2005). From an experimental point of view, the main reason for 
inconsistent results is that various methodological approaches are used.  
 
First, different types of games are studied e.g. the public goods game, the UG, and the 
DG. Second, some games are performed as single shots while others are repeated. 
Third, some studies give the participants information about the other players while 
others keep the anonymity of the players. Fourth, the risk for the participants may vary, 
depending on if the strategy or the game method is applied. In the strategy method the 
respondent makes the decision at the same time as the proposer while the game method 
lets the responder make his/her decision after the proposer. Consequently, in the game 
approach the responder knows the outcome once his/her decision has been made (Eckel 
and Grossman, 2008). Fifth, some studies let the participants interact before the actual 
game. Sixth, studies may apply different reimbursement methods.  
 
A UG study by Solnick et al, which had a similar experimental design to Study II and 
III (single-shot but strategy method), showed no sex differences in rejection rate 
(Solnick, 2001). In contrast, Eckel et al. observed sex differences in a punishment game 
where the participants could choose either to split a larger amount of money with a 
previously unfair player or a smaller amount of money with a previously fair player 
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(Eckel and Grossman, 1996). Females were more prone, than males, to split money 
with the fair player when the cost was low. Nevertheless, this propensity for females 
was abolished when the cost to implement fairness was higher. Interestingly, male 
choices to split money with the fair player did not vary with the cost; they behaved the 
same in both conditions (Eckel and Grossman, 1996). Andreoni et al showed that males 
and females differ in donation behavior in the DG (Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001). 
The differences went in the opposite direction depending on the price for donation. 
Females donated more money, compared to males, when the price for donation was 
high. In contrast, males donated more money, compared to females, when the price for 
donation was low (Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001). Lastly, in a study by Brown-Kruse, 
it was demonstrated that males donated more money at higher rates, than females, in a 
public goods game (Brown-Kruse and Hummels, 1993). Taken together, the literature 
on sex differences on economic decisions is inconsistent.  
 
As for sex differences in the UG and other related games, sex differences in 
hypothetical bias paradigms are ambiguous. Again, these differences may depend on 
methodological inconsistencies. In a choice experiment where participants were asked 
to express their willingness to pay to protect the forest, Ladenburg et al. found that 
females were more susceptible to starting point bias (reference prices) and hypothetical 
bias than men who expressed more stable preferences (Ladenburg and Olsen Boye, 
2010). The authors suggest that this difference is partly due to that females are more 
uncertain of their choices than men.   
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3 METHODS  
 
3.1 ETHICAL APPROVAL AND INFORMED CONSENT  
All studies included in this thesis were approved by the governmental regional ethical 
review board in Stockholm, Sweden. Every single subject in this thesis gave their 
informed consent (in writing) to participate.  
 
3.2 SUBJECTS 
Common to all four studies were that subjects were recruited by advertisement and 
were healthy with no past or present history of psychiatric or neurological illness. They 
were right handed, non-smokers, and fluent in Swedish. All female participants negated 
that they were pregnant. Over all, participants took no medications but females were 
allowed to take contraceptives. Subjects who took mild allergic medications (e.g. beta 
agonist inhalation) were accepted as long as it had not been taken prior to the 
experiment. (Please see the original research articles for more specific details.)  All 
subjects were asked to fill out a medical screening questionnaire prior to the 
experiment; this procedure enabled us to exclude subjects that were unhealthy or 
fulfilled a contraindication for magnetic imaging examination.  
 
3.3 SUBJECTIVE RATINGS AND QUESTIONERS  
Visual analogue scales (VAS) (Wewers and Lowe, 1990) were used in Study I to assess 
subjective experience of pleasantness, unpleasantness, drowsiness and the ability to 
focus. In Study II and III VAS were used to assess the likeability of the proposers. State 
trait anxiety index (STAI) was used in Study I and II to measure both state and trait 
anxiety (Spielberger, 1970).  
 
3.4 PICTURE STIMULI 
In Study I, we used standardized picture material from the international affective 
picture system (IAPS) (Lang et al., 1999). The IAPS material contains neutral, pleasant 
and unpleasant pictures that are classified according to their arousal, valance and 
dominance. These pictures have been rated by males, females, and children according 
to a scale that ranges from one to nine. A higher figure corresponds to a higher intensity 
of arousal or positive valance. Neutral pictures are considered to have an arousal and 
valance around five. In Study I, the picture material was balanced for facial content.   
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In Study IV, only a few pictures were depicted from the IAPS material. The majority of 
pictures were found on the internet and the reason for this was that not enough pictures 
in the IAPS material represented our donation categories. The pictures found on the 
internet were rated, by three experimenters, for valance and arousal according to the 
IAPS convention. In addition, the pictures were also balanced for complexity and facial 
content.  
 
3.5 FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC IMAGING  
Functional magnetic imaging (fMRI) measures changes in blood oxygenation in the 
brain by detecting the blood onset level dependent (BOLD) signal. The BOLD signal 
reflects the ratio between deoxygenated blood which is paramagnetic (gives strong 
signal) and oxygenated blood (gives weak signal) that is diamagnetic. When blood flow 
to a neural area increases the deoxygenated blood is washed out and a signal drop is 
detected. In recent years, studies have shown that the BOLD signal corresponds to 
changes in local field potentials which mirror post synaptic activity i.e. input to a neural 
population (Arthurs and Boniface, 2002; Lauritzen, 2005).   
 
3.5.1 Statistical parametric mapping 
Statistical parametric mapping (SPM) is a method that is used to analyze fMRI data 
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/) and make inference about effects of interest 
(Friston, 2007). The initial steps in the analysis include the following preprocessing 
operations: realignment, slice timing correction, co-registration/estimation, 
segmentation, normalization, and smoothing.  
 
During the scanning process subjects are asked to lie very still. Nevertheless, it is 
impossible to lie totally still during a whole experiment. Therefore, motion correction 
(realignment) is a necessary step in data preprocessing. Realignment is the process that 
corrects data for movements in six dimensions. This correction places all the pictures 
taken from one subject in the same space and assures a homogenous anatomical 
reference (Friston, 2007).  It is considered that an acceptable level of movement is 
maximum 3 mm and subjects who move more than 3 mm should be excluded. 
Importantly, none of our participants were excluded due to too much motion; in fact, a 
majority of our subjects, in all three fMRI studies, moved less than 2 mm.  
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In fMRI, all slices making up a volume are acquired at different time points. During 
this time, the BOLD signal changes. In order to compensate for the time it takes to 
collect a volume and the BOLD signal changes during this time a normalization 
procedure is made. This normalization technique is called slice timing correction 
(Ashburner et al., 2005).  
 
As all brains are anatomically unique there is a need to normalize subjects‟ brains to a 
template brain. This process is called normalization and enables inter-individual 
comparisons (Ashburner et al., 2005). The anatomical template used in this thesis was 
taken from the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI).  
 
The last preprocessing step is called smoothing and is necessary to reduce anatomical 
variability between subjects and to increase the signal to noise ratio (SNR). In the 
smoothing processes a Gaussian kernel is used to convolve the data i.e. each voxel is 
replaced by an average voxel calculated from the surrounding voxels (Ashburner et al., 
2005).  
 
After preprocessing single-subject analyses and multi-subject analyses were performed. 
To find more details about the particular models used in this thesis please see the 
original research articles.  
  
3.5.2 General linear model 
To make statistical inferences about fMRI data it is common to use the general linear 
model (GLM). The method breaks down raw data into effects and errors by using the 
following equation (Friston and Stephan, 2007): 
 
y (t) = Xβ  + ε  
 
The y equals the measured BOLD signal i.e. the observed response variable. This 
variable is also the dependent variable and is a function of time (t). X corresponds to 
the model‟s design matrix and includes the explanatory variables; these variables are 
the independent variables. The beta quantifies how much each predictor (independent 
variable) independently influences the dependent variable (y). The ε represents the 
error term and reflects variance in the data (y) which is not explained by the linear 
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combination of predictors (x).  Moreover, the GLM assumes Gaussian spherical errors 
which mean that the errors are independent and identically distributed.  
 
3.5.3 Hypothesis testing 
In science the common scenario is that one wants to disprove the null hypothesis i.e. 
that there is no effect. To do this there are different methods. One frequent method that 
has been used throughout this thesis is the T-test statistics.  
 
3.5.4 T-statistics 
The T-statistics gathers evidence about the null hypothesis. When the T-statistic value 
is high the null hypothesis is usually false and when the value is low the null hypothesis 
is commonly true. In SPM we get the T-statistics by dividing the “contrast of estimated 
parameters” with the square root of the “variance estimate.”  By using this approach we 
can separate whether there is a difference between an active experimental state and a 
control condition.  
 
3.5.5 Multiple comparisons 
In fMRI, several brain volumes are collected during an experiment. Each of the brain 
volumes consist of more than 100 000 voxels and all these voxels are analyzed by the 
SPM program. When statistical calculations are made and a p-value of 0.05 is used 
more than 5000 voxels will be significant by chance. Therefore, it is of importance to 
adjust for multiple comparisons. Unless otherwise stated the imaging data in this thesis 
have been family wise error (FWE) corrected to minimize this problem.  
 
3.5.6 Psychophysiological interaction  
Psychophysiological interactions (PPI) measures whether there is an interaction 
between the psychological state and the functional coupling between two brain areas 
(Friston et al., 1997). The aim with PPI analysis is to look for areas which have a higher 
correlation with the time-course in the seed region in one psychological context 
compared to another. To perform this analysis an interaction variable between the time 
course of the experiment and the seed region is created. Thereafter, the analysis 
investigates if the interaction variable correlates with any other brain regions. To avoid 
problems with correlations which are e.g. driven by a shared task input, the 
 46 
psychological and physiological time-courses from which the interaction term in the 
GLM was derived from, were included as covariates of no interest (Friston et al., 1997). 
 
3.5.7 Methodological considerations 
3.5.7.1 Baseline 
Which baseline that has been used, is an important aspect to reflect upon when 
critically scrutinizing brain imaging studies. fMRI is a methodology based on contrasts, 
where one condition is compared to another. Importantly, there is no zero or tonic level 
of brain activity and hence, an implicit baseline is always used. Stark et al. 
demonstrated that depending on which “baseline” they used in a cognitive memory 
paradigm, they could either reduce, eliminate, or reverse a neural activity of interest 
during a cognitive task (Stark and Squire, 2001). Thus, the use of baseline is crucial to 
what results one receives. In Study II, III, and IV, we mentioned that we have 
compared different conditions to “baseline.” In these studies we don‟t refer to any 
active baseline; instead, we have zeroed out all variables in the GLM model, with the 
exception of the variable of interest that has been set to one.  
 
3.5.7.2 Reverse inference  
Reverse inference refers to the procedure by which the engagement of a particular 
cognitive process is inferred from the activation of a particular brain region. However, 
such interpretation is not valid (Poldrack, 2006) and such information alone does not 
provide convincing evidence that an anatomical region in the brain can be tied to a 
specific cognitive function. 
 
Importantly, there are a couple of factors that can enhance the evidence for reverse 
inference (Poldrack, 2006). First, the higher selectivity of the response of a particular 
brain region to a certain task, the higher the probability that the reverse inference 
provides useful information. That is, if a particular region is only activated by a very 
particular task. Second, if the proposed region of interest gets enhanced activity by 
other regions that are known to be connected to the specific region, this adds value to 
the interpretation. Third, the smaller the brain region, the more confident one can be as 
smaller regions seem to have more distinct functions. Fourth, converging behavioral 
evidence, that is, the degree of a behavioral outcome that co-varies with neural activity 
also strengthens the evidence of reverse inference. 
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In the three imaging studies presented in this thesis, the selectivity was quite good and 
our main region of interest was fairly small. We could also provide converging 
behavioral evidence, so the results obtained in the presented studies are of good 
methodological practice. Nevertheless, our results need to be replicated and studied 
from additional angles in order to provide even stronger evidence. 
 
3.5.7.3 Voxel-level, cluster-level and set-level corrected results 
The functional brain imaging studies in this thesis report results that are either voxel-
level, cluster-level, or set-level corrected. This following section will briefly explain the 
differences between the three levels and the inference that can be made from these 
corrections (for more detailed information please see Friston et al. (Friston et al., 
1996)).  
 
First, voxel-level correction means that a specific voxel in the search (brain) volume is 
unlikely to have occurred by chance. If the voxel is just a single voxel in a larger 
volume, the result is more likely to have occurred by chance (type 1 error). In contrast, 
if the significant voxel is part of a cluster i.e. it is surrounded by a group of voxels, the 
probability that the voxel has been activated by chance is rather low.  Such a result also 
gives a strong indication of localization. 
 
Second, cluster-level correction indicates that a group of adjacent localized voxels 
contributes to a significant activation even though the individual voxels themselves are 
not significant. It is not possible to localize more specifically where in the cluster the 
“significant” activity is.  
 
Third, set-level correction refers to a number of clusters composing an activation that is 
unlikely to have taken place by chance. Although we cannot assign any regionally 
defined effects of set-level corrected results we can state that somewhere in one or 
more of these clusters there is brain activity going on that is not a result of chance. In 
Study III, we used a bilateral amygdala mask and reported set-level significant results. 
Importantly, these results are statistically valid, this means that they can be inferred as 
there is a significant activity going on in amygdala. However, we cannot state where in 
amygdala the activity is localized.  
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In conclusion, the three levels of significance answer three different questions i.e. 1) Is 
this specific voxel significantly active? 2) Is there any significant activity in this 
cluster? and 3) Is there any significant activity in this network (set)? 
 
3.6 BEHAVIORAL ANALYSES 
3.6.1 Study I 
The statistical analysis of the VAS ratings and the score in the recognition test was 
carried out using non-parametric tests. Friedman‟s test was used to calculate the main 
effect of picture content and drug effect, while the Wilcoxon signed rank test evaluated 
the specific contrasts. The correlation analysis examining the relationship between the 
STAI and the VAS ratings was carried out using the non-parametric test Spearman‟s 
rho. A parametric two-way repeated measurement analysis of variance analyzed the 
main effects of drug treatment and picture content on heart rate and reaction time. 
Specific contrasts were then evaluated with the Student‟s t test. A value of p < 0.05 was 
considered as significant. All the results from the specific contrasts (both parametric 
and non-parametric) were corrected for multiple comparisons using the Bonferroni 
correction. 
 
3.6.2 Study II and III 
The effect of the treatment on rejection rate for unfair proposals was first analyzed with 
a Mann-Whitney U test (one-tailed in Study II and two-tailed in Study III), since we 
could not assume normally distributed data. To control for stake size, sex, and ordering 
of decisions we analyzed the individual choices with probit regressions, since each 
individual decision was binary in nature (i.e. “yes” or “no”). Standard errors were 
clustered on subjects to account for repeated measures. Since no fair offers were 
rejected we restricted our attention to the unfair responses. Differences in ratings of 
fairness and likeability were analyzed with the Mann-Whitney U test. We used two-
tailed tests as we had no prior assumption about the direction of a potential treatment 
effect. 
 
3.6.3 Study IV 
In order to establish the existence of a hypothetical bias in our experimental setting we 
investigated, with a mixed panel logit regression, if there were any discrepancies 
between real and hypothetical decisions. The mixed logit model describes behavior in 
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terms of probabilities that an individual will, or will not, donate money. Furthermore, 
the probabilities were dependent on: stake level, donation, gender, hypothetical, or real 
treatment, donation target (Swedish Childhood Cancer Foundation, Stockholm City 
Mission, Doctors Without Borders, Water Aid Sweden, Urskog 2000, Vi-Skogen, Save 
the Seals in the Baltic and Save the Tigers (WWF)) and some interactions between 
these variables. The marginal willingness‟ to pay for these four categories was given by 
the quota between the marginal utility of donations (“total donation” parameter) and the 
marginal utility of spending money (“you pay” parameter).  
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4 AIMS 
 
The general aim of this thesis was to investigate neural mechanisms of emotional 
regulation and decision making using different pharmacological manipulations and 
brain imaging techniques.  
 
• In Study I, we aimed to investigate if CCK and remifentanil could modulate visual 
emotional perception in opposite directions. 
 
• In Study II, we aimed to examine if amygdala was involved in social punishment and 
if oxazepam could reduce emotional processing in the UG and decrease rejection rate 
of unfair proposals concomitantly with decreasing amygdala activity. 
 
• In Study III, we aimed to replicate Study II and examine if L-DOPA could potentiate 
emotional processing in the UG and increase rejection rate of unfair proposals 
concomitantly with increasing amygdala activity. 
 
• In Study IV, we investigated neural mechanisms of hypothetical bias.  
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5 RESULTS AND BRIEF DISCUSSION 
 
5.1 STUDY I  
The CCK and opioid neuromodulatory systems work in opposite directions and can 
modulate emotional states and noxious input in opposite directions. In Study I we 
generalized this idea and investigated if the CCK and opioid neuromodulatory systems 
worked in opposite directions to modulate emotional perception. Subjects were 
presented neutral and unpleasant pictures while one of three treatments was randomly 
administered: the CCKb receptor agonist pentagastrin (0.1 μg/kg), the mu-opioid 
receptor agonist remifentanil (0.0625 μg/kg), or saline. Self-ratings of the emotional 
experience of pictures and drugs were sampled together with psychological tests and 
recording of heart rate. We showed that pentagastrin (CCK) treatment increased the 
rating of unpleasantness for both neutral and unpleasant pictures, while it decreased the 
rating of pleasantness for the neutral pictures. These effects did not correlate with the 
degree of general unpleasantness induced by the drug. Remifentanil treatment increased 
the pleasantness for the neutral pictures. While pentagastrin treatment induced a heart 
rate increase, unpleasant pictures induced a heart rate decrease, and the magnitude of 
change in heart rate correlated positively for these conditions. Thus, we propose that the 
CCK and the opioid system are involved in regulating emotional perception. The 
effects of remifentanil were more complex than our hypothesis. This suggests that 
different opioids may play various roles in modulation of emotional perception.  
 
5.2 STUDY II  
A previous influential study (Sanfey et al., 2003) on the UG has suggested that a 
cortical structure (i.e. insula) has a pivotal role for rejection in the UG. This view is not 
in line with other studies on decision making that have shown that amygdala is 
important for decision making. In Study II, we examined if amygdala, a subcortical 
structure important for decision making, was involved in neural processing of 
unfairness and rejection behavior in the UG. We also proposed an anatomy-informed 
model that aimed to reconcile these views. Furthermore, we introduced a design that 
detects the functional anatomical response of a reactive aggressive reaction in response 
to unfair UG proposals. We used an fMRI compatible UG paradigm to study the early 
components of decision making and challenged our paradigm with the introduction of 
an anxiolytic drug (oxazepam 20 mg), as to perturb the elicited behavioral and neural 
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response. Oxazepam treatment, compared to placebo, decreased the rejection rate (from 
37.6 % to 19.0 %) concomitantly with a diminished amygdala response to unfair 
proposals. This effect was observed in spite of an unchanged feeling of unfairness and 
likeability of the proposers. In the control group, rejection was directly linked to 
increased amygdala activity. These results allow a functional anatomical detection of 
the early neural components of rejection associated with the initial reactive emotional 
response. Hence, the act of immediate rejection seems to be mediated by the limbic 
system and is not solely driven by cortical processes as previously suggested. Our 
results also prompt an ethical discussion as we demonstrated that a commonly used 
drug influences core functions in the human brain that underlies individual autonomy 
and economic decision making. 
 
5.3 STUDY III  
The dopamine system is known to enhance reactive aggressive responses and 
impulsivity. In contrast to Study II, we were interested to investigate if dopamine 
treatment (100 mg madopark) could increase rejection of unfair proposals in the (UG) 
concomitantly with increasing amygdala response. The same experimental procedure, 
as presented in Study II, was performed in Study III with the exception of 
pharmacological treatment. Dopamine treatment, compared to placebo, tended to drive 
behavior towards an increased rejection rate (from 20.1 % to 26.7 %, n.s.) 
concomitantly with increasing amygdala activity in response to unfair proposals 
without affecting perception of fairness or likeability of the individual proposers. This 
result is in agreement with our previous study where we demonstrated the opposite 
effect with an anxiolytic drug intervention. Our results indicate that amygdala 
participates in rejection behavior and neural processing of unfairness. As dopamine 
treatment increased activation in nucleus caudatus in all proposal conditions our study 
suggests that dopamine affects reward circuitries in both unfair and fair situations. 
Ergo, the neural mechanisms by which dopamine affects behavioral and neural 
responses in the UG may be more complex than just increasing aggression. 
 
5.4 STUDY IV  
People tend to exaggerate hypothetical decisions compared to real decisions. The 
discrepancy between a hypothetical choice versus a real choice is called hypothetical 
bias. In Study IV, we investigated neural mechanisms of hypothetical bias with a 
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donation paradigm using fMRI. Subjects were divided into two different groups, one 
hypothetical and one real. Subjects in the real group made choices that could cost (i.e. if 
they choose to accept a donation proposal and if that proposal was randomly selected to 
be realized) while subjects in the hypothetical group made hypothetical choices that did 
not cost.  Previous fMRI studies have demonstrated that amygdala is involved in instant 
aversive decision making and costly calculations whereas cortical structures have been 
shown to participate in contemplated decisions. We hypothesized that amygdala would 
be involved in real decisions while cortical structures would be associated with 
hypothetical decisions. We demonstrated that there was a functional limbic 
involvement in hypothetical bias behavior. Real donations (choices) activated the 
amygdala more than hypothetical donations. Donations were more common at low 
stake levels, compared to high stake levels, and at the low levels there was more 
expressed amygdala activation. The act of donation was linked with both amygdala 
activation and an increased activity in the caudate nucleus and ACC. Interestingly, 
insular activity in response to the presentation of a charitable organization predicted 
upcoming donation behavior, i.e. the more activation that was observed in the insula the 
greater was the likelihood of donation. In conclusion, we have segregated the neural 
mechanisms involved in hypothetical bias. Our findings imply that the emotional 
system has an important role in real decision making as it signals what kind of cost and 
reward an outcome is associated with.   
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6 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The general aim of this thesis was to investigate neural mechanisms of emotional 
regulation and economic decision making using pharmacological interventions and 
fMRI. Overall, we demonstrated that neuromodulatory systems are involved in the 
regulation of emotional perception and economic decision making.  
 
6.1 THE OPIOID SYSTEM BEYOND THE HYPOTHESIS 
In Study I, we show that the CCK and opioid system are involved in regulating 
emotional perception in a similar manner as they modulate pain processing. In line with 
our hypothesis, we found that both neutral and unpleasant pictures were experienced as 
more unpleasant after pentagastrin treatment. The results for remifentanil treatment 
were more complex. There was a trend that the unpleasant pictures were experienced as 
more pleasant after remifentanil treatment, but remifentanil did not decrease 
unpleasantness for aversive pictures as hypothesized. This may be explained by the mu-
opioid system as not being involved in suppressing emotional aversive processing, as it 
suppresses nociceptive processing. This would be in line with animal studies which 
have shown that the delta, but not the mu-opioid, system is involved in the modulation 
of aversive non-noxious processing. These findings indicate that a mu-opioid agonist 
may be more effective in augmenting a pleasant response than suppressing an 
unpleasant process to external input, which is in line with the idea that we perceive 
emotions in a multidimensional space and not via a mutually exclusive one-
dimensional scale (Larsen et al., 2001; Rolls, 1995; Schimmack, 2001).  
 
In Study I, we did not detect any interactions between any factors e.g. picture content 
and drug treatment. As a consequence, we can only say that the CCK-opioid system 
had a general effect on emotional processing, but we cannot distinguish more specific 
roles than that. This was the main reason we did not continue to investigate these 
systems further.  
 
6.2 PRECISE TIMING 
The fMRI studies presented in this thesis are unique, in comparison to previous studies 
on the same topics (Kang et al., 2011; Sanfey et al., 2003), in that they have a very 
precise timing for when the decisions were actually made. Prior studies have only used 
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imprecise onset times for when the decisions of the participants were made. For 
example, in Sanfey et al. they defined the time of the decision to four seconds after the 
actual monetary proposal had first been presented (Sanfey et al., 2003). This method 
only allowed for detection of slower neural processes. As our onset time design was 
very accurate, it enabled us to detect rapid and transient processes in subcortical 
structures like the amygdala. By using this approach we could contribute with the novel 
findings that the amygdala is involved in social punishment and hypothetical bias, 
something that had not been shown before.  
 
6.3 COMPARING OUR RESULTS WITH PREVIOUS STUDIES 
Three previous imaging papers, besides Study III, have been published on the UG 
(Rilling et al., 2004; Sanfey et al., 2003; Tabibnia et al., 2008). The paper by Sanfey et 
al. has been the most influential and the study closest to ours.  
 
The study by Rilling et al. primarily investigated questions related to theory of mind 
and playing the UG against a computer versus a human being. Therefore, this study is 
not very compatible to ours. The last study by Tabibnia et al. studies fairness and not 
unfairness (rejection rate). Their study design also has a major shortcoming as their 
paradigm is non-jittered. Hence, there is a time-lock between face presentations and the 
proposal as well as the next event. Thus, their effects that relate to the fairness 
presentation cannot be separated from the face presentation (it is known that face 
presentation triggers an amygdala response (Vuilleumier and Pourtois, 2007)). In our 
judgment, the most valid study to compare our results with is Sanfey et al. (Sanfey et 
al., 2003).  
 
In Study II and III, parts of our main effects of unfair proposals are, at first glance, in 
variance with the results presented by Sanfey et al. (Sanfey et al., 2003). The reason for 
that is that we implemented a more conservative statistical correction procedure than 
Sanfey et al. (Gospic et al., 2011). Importantly, post hoc analyses in Study II and III 
revealed that our data gave rise to Z-scores in the same range as the values presented 
for insula activation in Sanfey et al. (Gospic et al., 2011; Sanfey et al., 2003).  
 
Other factors that may have contributed to different results are number of trials and 
stake levels. The participants in Sanfey et al. only watched 10 trials with human 
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partners (out of 30) whereas our participants were presented with 45 trials (all by 
human partners); consequently our studies had more power to detect smaller 
differences. Lastly, participants in Sanfey et al. played about stake levels reaching from 
$1 to $5 whereas our participants played about stakes reaching from $3 to $38. This 
could have affected the “realness” of the study which we know from Study IV activates 
amygdala as well as how emotionally involved participants became in the task as more 
money was at stake in our studies. All in all, the apparent differences in neural activity 
between our UG studies and Sanfey et al. can be accounted for methodologically.  
 
6.4 THE REALNESS OF THE PROPOSER  
In Study III, we noted that the overall rejection rate was low compared to Study II and 
other UG studies (Crockett et al., 2010; Sanfey et al., 2003). At first glance this may 
seem as the responders in Study III were more selfish. In the post hoc interviews some 
subjects stated that even though an offer seemed unfair they did not want to reject it 
because then the responder would not receive any money. Some participants stated that 
the proposers were probably “poor students” and it would be better that an unfair split 
was realized than neither of them getting any money. This kind of reasoning indicates 
that participants were involved in complex reasoning and expressed a great deal of 
empathy. Our results imply that the more “real” the proposer is to the participant the 
less rejection rate. This result is in contrast to other studies that demonstrated that 
human offers compared to computerized offers were more often rejected (Rilling et al., 
2004; Sanfey et al., 2003). In addition, Sanfey et al. only presented pictures of their 
proposers while we showed movie clips; this may account for some of the differences. 
These differences could also be explained by cultural differences or type of student 
cohort. Nevertheless, these are just speculations and these findings need to be more 
thoroughly investigated.  
 
6.5 THE REALNESS OF THE PROPOSAL 
The “realness” of the proposal seems also to be an important factor affecting rejection 
rate. In our UG studies, 3 out of 45 proposals were realized whereas the studies made 
by Crocket et al. (Crockett et al., 2010; Crockett et al., 2008) only realized one or two 
proposals, out of 96 proposals. This may have induced a hypothetical bias; i.e. our 
studies might have been more real than previous studies which could have caused a 
lower rejection rate. The realness in our studies can also have contributed to our 
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detection of amygdala activity, as we show in Study IV that real decisions involve more 
limbic processing than hypothetical decisions. Unfortunately, there are no behavioral 
studies which have investigated the effect of the amount of realized proposals to 
hypothetical decisions in the UG. Importantly, these are key aspects for future research 
to clarify.  
 
Similar to the UG studies, one can also question the realness of the real group in Study 
IV, as only one proposal was realized. Nevertheless, we were still able to demonstrate a 
difference between the groups which indicates that the real proposals were at least more 
real than the hypothetical proposals. It is likely that the results could have been even 
stronger if more offers had been realized. Due to economic costs not all of the 
proposals could be realized.  
 
6.6 INSULA ACTIVITY - A REFLECTION OF FEELING STATE 
In Study IV, we demonstrated that increased insula activity during the presentation of 
the donation target predicted acceptance behavior. This result may be interpreted as the 
more the subjects got emotionally involved in a donation target (picture) the more 
empathic they became and the more proposals they accepted. It is plausible that the 
insula activity reflects the subjects‟ ability to emotionally simulate themselves in the 
context presented to them. One may speculate that this could either have contributed to 
a feeling state of pity or warm-glow. In the context of the UG (Study II and III), insula 
activity may represent something similar i.e. we get more emotionally engaged when 
someone treats us unfairly. All these findings fit well into the frame work of feeling 
states, empathic processes, and neural predictors of purchase (Craig, 2009; Knutson et 
al., 2007; Singer et al., 2006). Thus, insula participates in processes that involve 
interoception and emotions.  
 
6.7 ONE BLOB - DIFFERENT PROCESSES 
In Study IV, we showed that there was a functional limbic involvement in hypothetical 
bias behavior. In concordance with Study II and III, where real instant decisions were 
made, we showed in Study IV that amygdala was more involved in real decisions than 
hypothetical decisions. Moreover, amygdala activity followed the actual cost for the 
participant than stake level per se as low stake proposals were more frequently 
accepted.  
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In Study IV, we could not separate which effects that were related to the “real factor” 
versus donation behavior, especially, as the latter variable differed between males and 
females. Nonetheless, we can most likely state that the amygdala signal reflects some 
sort of real signal because if the amygdala signal was only dependent on donation 
behavior one could speculate that opposite donation behaviors would cancel each other. 
Alternatively, different donation behaviors could have given rise to the “same” 
amygdala activity but mirror different processes.  
 
In the interaction contrast (real group versus hypothetical group) where we compared 
low stakes versus high stakes across the whole sample, we detected an increase in 
amygdala activity in the real group. Even though the overall donation behavior differed 
between males and females both groups still donated more money for low stakes which 
indicates that  amygdala signals the real cost of donation. 
 
One can question how amygdala could signal for two different states, the real factor 
and the actual cost. A plausible explanation would be that there is a time domain effect 
that is not caught with fMRI i.e. the real factor may be the initial response to a donation 
proposal whereas the actual cost may be a secondary feed-back response that is 
signaled later in time. This discussion is also valid for Study II and III where we could 
not completely differentiate rejection behavior from the neural processing of 
unfairness. Again, it is plausible that these processes give rise to similar signals, but are 
separated in time. Conclusively, as the time resolution in fMRI is not optimal to detect 
adjacent voxels, these phenomena are something that need further investigation (see 
section 8).  
 
6.8 EVIDENCE FOR A MODIFIED TWO-LEVEL MODEL 
In all three imaging studies we demonstrate that amygdala, a subcortical structure, is 
involved in immediate rejection of unfair proposals in the UG and hypothetical bias. 
Thus, opposed to previous studies on the same matter (Kang et al., 2011; Sanfey et al., 
2003) we showed that it is not only cortical structures that are involved in rejection 
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Table 1. Schematic overview of the modified two-level model for decision making. This model 
suggests that there are three anatomical levels that accounts for five domains i.e. information about time, 
stimuli representation, reward, action selection and outcome evaluation. This table is based on 
information from a number of studies (Craig, 2009; Fuster, 1999; Fuster, 2008; LeDoux, 1999; Rolls and 
Grabenhorst, 2008; Vuilleumier, 2005; Vuilleumier et al., 2001).  
 
behavior, neural processing of unfairness and hypothetical bias, but subcortical 
structures like the amygdala play an important role as well.  
 
In Gospic et al. we reconciled how cortical and subcortical mechanisms contribute to 
choice behavior by applying a two level model for decision making (Gläscher et al., 
2010; Gospic et al., 2011)(section 2.3.4.1). In this thesis we present a modified model 
where we introduce an intermediate level and five domains (see below) that account for 
each of these levels (Table 1). 
 
More specifically, our model proposes that there are two major anatomical levels (the 
cortical and subcortical level) and one intermediate anatomical level that influence 
decision making. Common to all three levels is that they contain information about the 
time domain, stimuli representation, reward, action selection, and outcome evaluation. 
In our model we suggest that the cortical level (frontal cortex) upholds a rich informed 
choice model where future considerations can be processed and different outcomes can 
be compared (Fuster, 1999). We also suggest that there is an intermediate level 
represented by the insula and OFC that represents the individuals‟ current state and 
feelings and can influence both cortical and subcortical structures as well as adjusting 
homeostasis to current contextual changes (Craig, 2009).  
 
Lastly, we suggest that there is a subcortical level represented by the amygdala that is 
responsible for immediate emotional reactions evaluated in simple positive or negative 
matters and that affects motivation status. Results from Study II, III, IV and Sanfey et 
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al. fit well into this framework and as our imaging studies show activations in areas 
belonging to all these levels it indicates that all these systems work in parallel even 
though one/some level/s can be more pronounced in one context and less active in 
another context (Gospic et al., 2011; Sanfey et al., 2003). Importantly, we have access 
to all these different levels to enable the best possible adaption to the current context.  
 
6.9 THE QUESTION OF CAUSALITY 
The development of fMRI has led to more advanced techniques to investigate causality 
of neuroanatomical structures in human behavior. From a simplified view, there are 
three generations of fMRI studies.  
 
The first generation investigated which areas were activated in response to a certain 
stimulus. Making reverse inference from these kinds of findings does not reveal much 
about causality (see section 3.5.7.2). The second generation of fMRI studies 
investigated neuropsychological phenomena in a similar manner as the first generation, 
with one exception, they had a hypothesis as to which regions would be involved. The 
third generation studies evoke activation according to the second generation approach, 
with the addition that these activations are challenged with e.g. pharmacological 
interventions or transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). The third generation studies 
are the ones that come closest to investigating whether a structure plays a causal role in 
behavior. Still, these interventions cannot fully verify causality as they are not 100 % 
specific. For example, we do not know exactly where the receptors that we affect with 
pharmacological interventions are located. We just assume that we affect the regions 
with the highest density of the receptor type that is of interest to us. In addition, we do 
not know if the drug we are using affects any other neurochemical system that may 
actually cause the effect we observe. TMS is not a perfect method either, as stimulation 
of one area also affects activity in remote interconnected regions (Driver et al., 2009). 
Therefore, one cannot exclude that more distant areas may cause the observed affect 
even though the target area of stimulation may be rather specific. Furthermore, TMS is 
unfortunately a difficult method to use in paradigms like UG and the donation task as 
one of the regions of interest (amygdala) is located deep in the brain and hard to reach.  
 
In this thesis, we introduced two studies, Study II and III, which belong to the third 
generation of fMRI studies. In Study II and III, we show that an anxiolytic drug could 
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reduce amygdala activity concomitantly with decreasing social punishment whereas a 
stimulating drug could increase amygdala activity and drive behavior towards an 
increased rejection rate. Accordingly, we were able to induce a behavior, social 
punishment, and then manipulate it in two opposite directions in parallel with 
decreasing or increasing the neural activity in a specific and well-defined neuro-
anatomical structure. This method enabled us to approach the question whether 
amygdala is causally involved in social punishment or not. Based on the results from 
Study II and III it is possible to assume that amygdala is causal for social punishment 
(rejection) in the UG; however, a more definite step to clarify this would be to use a 
lesion technique; this method will be further discussed in section 8. 
 
6.10 MANIPULATING HUMAN AUTONOMY PROMPTS AN ETHICAL 
DISCUSSION 
In Study II and Study III we showed that rejection behavior could be pharmacologically 
manipulated without changing either perception of unfairness or likeability of the 
proposers. As decision making is a core function of human behavior and constitutes a 
corner stone of autonomy, the finding that pharmacological manipulations can affect 
choice behavior without being recognized by the individual prompts an ethical 
discussion. In Sweden the use of anxiolytic drugs (oxazepam) is high, especially in the 
elderly population (Hoffmann et al., 2006), and L-DOPA is a common treatment for 
Parkinson‟s disease (Katzenschlager and Lees, 2002). Hence, it seems ethical to inform 
patients and their families about potential effects of these substances on their behavior 
and weigh these potential effects to the benefits of the medical treatment.  
 
Moreover, these facts raise a question - how are our societies affected when a large part 
of the population is under such treatment? One can speculate that this may have a 
particular impact when people in power are under pharmacological influence. For 
example, what would happen if prime ministers, stock brokers and CEOs constantly 
kept prioritizing pay off maximization over implementation of justice based on drug 
use? Could that possibly lead to war, financial bubbles, and humanitarian catastrophes 
or bring peace, financial stability, and equality? Nothing is certain, but it is worth 
contemplating about and something to investigate further.  
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This thesis demonstrates that neuromodulatory systems like the CCK-opioid system, 
the GABA system and the dopamine system are important for modulating emotional 
perception and economic decision making. We also showed that amygdala is important 
for instant rejection behavior and neural processing of unfairness as well as for real 
choice behavior. Seemingly, the common denominator for amygdala activity in the 
three brain imaging studies may be that it is involved in instant valuation processing of 
incoming stimuli. Lastly, we demonstrate that economic decision making can be 
pharmacologically manipulated without changing the perception of unfairness.   
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8 FUTURE PERSPECTIVES 
 
By identifying neural mechanisms of emotional regulation and decision making we can 
understand underlying physiological processes of human behavior. This kind of 
knowledge can lead to better predictions of human behavior which is beneficial for 
both individuals as well as for societies. In particular, this knowledge can be used to 
build better societies and develop treatment for patients who suffer from emotion 
related pathologies and/or impaired decision making.  
 
In Study I, it was not clear what kind of role the opioid system played in emotional 
regulation. Ergo, it would be of importance to identify more specific roles for different 
opioid peptides on emotional regulation. One would also require stronger behavioral 
results i.e. detection of interactions before proceeding to fMRI. This would probably 
mean that other types of paradigms should be used to detect such potential effects. In 
future fMRI studies it would be interesting to investigate where CCK-opioid system 
exerts its effect.  
 
We noted, in Study II and III, that amygdala was involved in both neural processing of 
unfair proposals and rejection behavior. It is of great importance to separate these two 
processes, for example by using magnetoencephalography (MEG). Since the fMRI 
technique is limited in the temporal domain (seconds), it is not possible to detect very 
fast transient processes (milliseconds). It is for future research to rule out the time 
aspects of the instant aggressive response and perception of unfairness and how these 
phenomena can be regulated by cortical structures. In Study III, there were two 
contrasting hypotheses of how dopamine would affect rejection behavior. We noted 
that dopamine administration drove behavior towards an increased rejection rate; the 
underlying reason this was observed is still speculation. Hence, it is of value to 
thoroughly investigate how the amygdala interacts with other neural structures. The 
causal role of amygdala involvement in the above stated processes could be 
investigated in detail by recruiting amygdala lesioned patients to play the UG.  
 
In Study IV, we observed amygdala involvement in real decisions versus hypothetical 
decisions and the amygdala signal co-varied with the cost that the participants faced. 
Some very obvious continuation studies would be to investigate whether hypothetical 
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bias could be pharmacologically manipulated in a similar manner to Study II and III 
and examine if hypothetical bias is present in amygdala lesioned patients. It would also 
be of great interest to see if experienced meditators would behave differently in a 
hypothetical bias context compared to controls as meditators possess a unique ability to 
regulate emotions (Rubia, 2009) and behave more rationally in economic games (Kirk 
et al., 2011).  
 
As in the previous fMRI studies, we could not distinguish the temporal resolution of 
amygdala activity in Study IV. Hence, it would be meaningful to separate amygdala 
responses related to the instant reactive response from feed-back signals with MEG.  
Similarly, it would also be of interest to segregate signals related to the “real factor” 
versus donation behavior. The donation behavior itself could also be more thoroughly 
studied by understanding if amygdala activity that has been generated by two different 
behaviors reflects the same kind of processing.  
 
We observed a variety of unexpected gender differences in Study II, III, and IV. These 
observations highlight the importance of studying both genders in economic paradigms. 
As seen in the introduction, there have been economic studies performed on the topic 
before, but they have varied to a great extent in methodological approach; thus, none of 
the studies have been replicated nor enabled comparisons with previous studies. It 
would be of great value and importance to systematically investigate behavioral and 
neural gender differences in economic experimental paradigms.   
 
Conclusively, in order to get a greater picture of what mechanisms are involved in 
emotional regulation and decision making the phenomena needs to be studied from 
multiple angles using different kinds of brain imaging techniques, pharmacological 
manipulations, genetics, and subject cohorts. Physiological and behavioral data also 
need to be more integrated with other sciences to give as complete picture as possible. 
For example, an interesting fusion according to my own opinion would be between 
neuroscience and physics.  
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